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CHEATER'S PROOF: EXCESSIVE JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 
TOWARD EDUCATIONAL TESTING AGENCIES MAY LEAVE 
ACCUSED EXAMINEES No REMEDY TO CLEAR THEIR 
NAMES 
Aron E. Goldschneide/ 
l. INTRODUCTION 
We live in an age in which standardized testing has become the 
principal means to judge the capabilities, educational level, and potential 
of young Americans. 1 As a result of Congress's No Child Left Behind 
Act, 2 many grade school students now learn in their tender years that 
numerically measurable achievement on standardized tests is the "be all 
and end all" of their schooling and the key to their educational fate. 3 
Increasingly, slower students are under great pressure to ferform 
adequately on standardized tests to avoid being held back, while 
'Associate, Law Finn of Daniel M. Jaffe, Philadelphia. B.F.A., New York University; J.D., Temple 
University Beasley School of Law. I would like to thank Diane Maleson, Temple University 
Professor of Law, for her encouragement in producing this paper. Thanks also to my loving family 
for their patience and support. 
I. As one critic of standardized testing describes the situation, "Our schools are in the midst 
of a mass panic not seen since the swine flu epidemic-standardized testing." Gary Stager, Halt the 
Testing Madness, 39 Dist. Administration 47 (July 2003) (available at http://www 
.districtadministration.com/page.cfm?p=443). 
2. No Child Left Behind Act of2001, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 6301-7941 (West Supp. 2003). 
3. See Stager, supra n. I (stating that the No Child Left Behind Act "will compel states to 
test their students every year from grades 2-12 in order to rank schools and shut many of them 
down. Our Proctor-in-Chief, George W. Bush, is extending the joys of standardized testing into 
Head Start"). 
4. Supporters of the No Child Left Behind law argue that it prevents schools from claiming 
good results based upon the perfonnance of the brightest students, while ignoring the perfonnance of 
slow students. Jay Mathews, Federal Law's Effect: Raised Expectations, http://www.washingtonpost 
.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentld= A 54 709-2003Jan 14&notF ound=true (Jan. 
14, 2003). Another view, however, is that the law encourages schools threatened with closure to 
leave students back in order to raise scores in the grade level to which the slow student is denied 
admittance, and perhaps in the repeated grade as well if he drops out. One academic, holding this 
view, suggests that, "'[i]t's not 'No Child Left Behind' ... it's 'Leave Them Behind and Blame 
Them Too' at its worst, and perhaps a little better than status quo at its best."' !d. (quoting Tim 
Hacsi, a Harvard Graduate School of Education researcher). 
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brighter students must score in the higher percentiles in order to be 
admitted to mentally gifted programs. 5 
Similarly, standardized testing dominates the consciousness of many 
college-bound high school students, who spend significant amounts of 
their energy, thought and time on preparing for college entrance exams. 
In response, a burgeoning movement in opposition to the Scholastic 
Aptitude Test (SAT) has challenged that test's purposes and efficacy,6 
with a significant number of colleges, including the entire state system of 
California, rejecting its use in their admissions criteria.7 Additionally, a 
growing number of students who resent the role the test plays in their 
lives have chosen to opt out of the SAT testing process altogether. 8 
Aside from criticism regarding standardized testing's worthiness as 
an educational tool, much of the controversy surrounding educational 
testing has been over the methodologies used in formulating standardized 
test questions. Charges that standardized test questions have inherent 
5. For just one example of a school district's use of test scores to determine entry to its gitted 
programs, see e.g. Providence Pub. Sch. Dist., Advanced Acad,mic Programs, Testing, http://www 
.providenceschools.org/dept/gifted/index.html (accessed Jan. 24, 2006) ("students receiving a 
combined score at or above the 6lst percentile on both the Naglieri Non-Verbal Ability Test and the 
district's SAT I 0 will move to the next phase of the selection process"). Se, also FairTest Examr., 
Tests Misused fi;r Enrichment Program Admissions, 
http://www.fairtest.org/examarts/spring96/cnrich.htm (Spring 1996) (describing how academic 
enrichment programs such as Northwestern University's Center for Talent Development, Stanford 
University's Education Program for Gifted Youth, and The Institute for the Academic Advancement 
of Youth (lA A Y) at Johns Hopkins University all usc the PSA T, SAT, ACT, or in the case of 
younger students, l.Q. tests, to identify gifted students and set minimum scores for admission to their 
programs). 
6. For example, Richard C. Atkinson, president of the University of California system has 
criticized those aspects of the exam that are vestiges of JQ tests, such as analogy sections that create 
a "perverse incentive" for students to spend time and money preparing for "idiosyncratic" SAT 
questions. Ben Gose & Jeffrey Selingo, The SAT's Greatest Test: Social, Legal, and Demographic 
Forces Threaten to Dethrone the Most Widely Used Co/lege-Entrance l:xam, Chron. of Higher 
Educ. A I 0 (Oct. 26, 200 I). 
7. In February of 200 I, the University of California system made the surprising 
announcement that its 170,000-student, nine-school group would no longer require the SAT for 
admission to its colleges, a decision that has led other state universities with competitive admissions 
such as North Carolina's public colleges and the University of Texas at Austin to reconsider their 
SAT requirements./d. Additionally, Harvard, M.l.T., and eleven other "top colleges" are now part of 
a study to determine whether state tests already administered in high schools could be relied upon to 
assess students for college admissions purposes. !d. 
8. For example, in one recent Colorado "testfest," a number of high school students 
performed music and read books outside the building in which their fellow students were subject to 
the rigors of the SAT. !d. Bill Wetzel, an NYU student and founder of an organization called 
Students Against Testing, has announced plans to craft similar protests. /d. Though Wetzel 
personally received an excellent 1420 SAT score, which no doubt helped him enter NYU, he says he 
now wishes he had chosen an SAT -optional school. !d. Wetzel criticizes the way in which many of 
his high school classes focused on achieving high SAT scores. "'I noticed the difference between 
some classes, where the teachers and the students were trying to get the highest scores possible, and 
classes that emphasized curiosity and real critical thinking."' /d. (quoting Bill Wetzel). 
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racial or gender biases have long been center stage in educational news,9 
periodically refreshed by new studies and research. 10 As a result, 
whether fair or not, the once-burnished image of the standardized test as 
the "great equalizer" against privilege is largely a thing of the past. 11 
Despite the controversy around standardized testing, exams like the 
12 13 14 15 . SAT, ACT, GRE, GMAT, and LSAT remam the gateway 
through which the vast majority of students must pass if they wish to be 
admitted to institutions of higher leaming. 16 Indeed, the College Board, 17 
while ostensibly admonishing colleges not to set minimum SAT 
requirements for admissions, continues to publish what appear to be 
minimum SAT "cut-offs" for more than twenty institutions in its College 
18 Board College Handbook. 
As if there were not enough controversy surrounding standardized 
9. See Gose & Selingo. supra n. 6. at A l 0 (noting that the College Board. owner of the SAT, 
"has done a good job holding onto the ball, [for close to twenty years] fending off critics who 
maintain that the test discriminates against female and minority students"'). 
I 0. /d. The College Board has consistently pointed to evidence that the SAT actually predicts 
that minority students will do hetter than they actually do in college. !d. Recent studies, however, 
have shown that questions employing "dit1icult"' vocabulary actually favor minorities while "easier" 
questions can be confusing to minority test takers because of cultural differences in their approach to 
basic language. Jeffrey R. Young, Researchers Charge Racial Bias on the SAT, Chron. of Higher 
Educ. A34 (Oct. I 0, 2003 ). 
11. See Nicholas Lcmann, The Big Test: Thl.' Sl!cret of" the American Meritocrac:v (Farrar, 
Straus & Giroux 1999). Leman explains that many educators involved in the evolution of 
standardized testing believed it to be a tool for democratizing change-·- from Clark Kerr, who as 
president of the University of California instituted a Master Plan hased on standardized testing to 
"create a fair opportunity for anyone to join the elite," to Stanley Kaplan, founder of the Kaplan test-
prep schools who began his career coaching Jewish middle and working-class students, much like 
himself, who prior to standardized testing were largely denied admittance to the higher echelons of 
educational opportunity. !d. at II 0-12. 136. Though the current higher education landscape is 
undoubtedly far more egalitarian than it was in the pre-testing age, standardized tests seem to have 
earned a reputation for impeding the progress of minorities while favoring those from the established 
classes. /d. 
12. "ACT,"' when referring to the exam American College Testing administers, stands for 
"American College Test." 
13. "GRE" stands for "Graduate Record Exam." 
14. "GMA T" stands for "General Management Aptitude Test." 
15. "LSA T" stands for "Law School Admission Test." 
16. Sel.' e.g Eric Hoover, The Changing Environment jiJr College Admissions, Chron. of 
Higher Educ. A30 (Nov. 29, 2002) (describing how the majority of colleges continue to raise their 
admissions standards, "including standardized-test scores and high-school grade-point averages" 
leading to a corresponding drop in the acceptance rate from sixty-eight percent in 1992 to sixty 
percent in 1999, despite decreasing numbers of students graduating high school). 
17. The College Entrance Examination Board (CEEB) is a non-profit educational 
organization, chartered more than a century ago, which has primarily functioned as an administrator 
of tests intended to dctennine which students will succeed in college. See in(ra nn. 41-50 and 
accompanying text for a fuller description of this organization. 
18. Gose & Selingo, supra n. 6, at A I 0. 
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admissions testing over its questionable pedagogical legitimacy and 
potential biases, it has become increasingly apparent that the integrity of 
the testing process itself may be less than reliable. Opportunities abound 
for students to gain advantages on standardized tests either through 
sophisticated test-prep coaching or various forms of cheating. In 
response, testing agencies reserve the right to, and do, invalidate scores 
they consider suspect, whether they be those of individual testees 
suspected of cheating or a class of test-takers, some of whom may have 
been privy to leaked test questions or information gathered from prior 
tests. 
The following Article discusses the legal conflict that arises when a 
test-taker challenges an invalidation determination made by a testing 
agency which has cancelled, or intends to cancel the test-taker's 
standardized test score. More specifically, the Article focuses on the 
legal hurdles the accused examinee must surmount in order to preserve 
the challenged score through legal action. The author argues that it is 
unduly burdensome for a test-taker to pursue a worthy claim under 
existing "testing law," due to the excessive deference paid to testing 
services by the courts, the difficulties in bringing equitable actions, and 
the limited legal avenues available to plaintiffs. Simply put, an innocent 
test-taker who has been unjustly accused of cheating may not be able to 
clear his/her name. 
Accordingly, the Article offers a critical look at the legal standards 
courts have set, primarily concerning the due process and contractual 
rights of test-takers, and offers suggestions for a more equitable 
approach. The author questions the established judicial policy of non-
interference in testing determinations and doubts the prevailing 
assumption that interference in testing agency determinations would 
threaten testing integrity. The author reasons that judicial deference may 
ultimately undermine testing validity, because it reinforces testing 
agencies' largely unfettered power to invalidate large score increases that 
might otherwise raise questions about testing reliability and fails to 
compel testing agencies to make meaningful improvements in testing 
administration and security. Part II of this Article discusses the scope of 
the standardized cheating problem, emphasizing emerging problems in 
maintaining testing validity. Part III provides background on the major 
institutions involved in standardized testing. Part IV presents a general 
overview of legal barriers to standardized testing invalidation challenges, 
with particular focus on the difficulties of bringing equitable actions. Part 
V focuses on the two main legal avenues available to standardized 
testing plaintiffs, with subsection A devoted to unconscionability and 
breach of contract claims, and subsection B discussing violation of due 
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process claims. Part VI provides a critical analysis of the chief 
assumptions underlying judicial deference to testing agency 
determinations. Finally, Part VII urges courts to reject formalistic 
enforcement of adhesion contracts and instead exercise powers of equity 
to validate examinee scores in appropriate cases. The author concludes 
that unless courts reconsider the unwarranted judicial deference accorded 
testing agencies, innocent test-takers wrongly accused by testing 
agencies will continue to be left without a meaningful legal remedy to 
clear their names and validate their scores. 
II. SCOPE OF THE CHEATING PROBLEM 
Standardized testing agencies are having an increasingly difficult 
time controlling exam security and maintaining testing validity. The 
scope and seriousness of recent security breaches indicate that 
standardized testing procedures are vulnerable to cheating on multiple 
fronts. Examinee access to re-used test questions prior to testing, high-
tech spying, and test-taking by imposter examinees a11 threaten the 
integrity of test-taking results, in part justifying the vigor with which 
test-taking agencies respond to those potential instances of cheating that 
they manage to discover. 
For example, the National Board of Podiatric Medical Examiners 
(NBPME) and its agent Chauncey, a subsidiary of the Educational 
Testing Service (ETS), not long ago invalidated an entire July 2002 
computer-based test taken by podiatry students at the New York College 
of Podiatric Medicine (NYCPM). 19 Claiming proof by "'documented 
evidence"' that NYCPM students had "access to 'documents containing 
secure test questions,"' the NBPME withheld score results and mailed 
notifications to students' intended recipients, mostly hospital residency 
programs, detailing its a11egations?0 
At roughly the same time that ETS's Chauncey subsidiary was 
invalidating the NYCPM students' scores, ETS was also issuing bu11etins 
to American universities that GRE scores from China, Taiwan, and South 
Korea might be suspect. 21 Attached to these warnings were bemusing 
qualifications that most Asian test-takers were hard-working and their 
19. Doe v. Nat/. Bd. of Podiatric Med. Examr., 2003 WL 21403698 at* I (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 
2003). 
20. !d. at** 1-2 (quoting the NBPME web site). In an ensuing action in the United District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, sixty NYCPM student plaintiffs brought an action to 
compel Chauncey to release their scores but failed to win a preliminary injunction. !d. at* I. 
21. David L. Wheeler, Testing Service Says GRE Scores From China, South Korea, and 
Taiwan Are Suspect, Chron. of Higher Educ. A41 (Aug. 16, 2002). 
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scores genuinely earned.22 Concerns over Asian GRE scores were 
prompted by information ETS obtained that students were using the 
Internet to post questions (and sometimes answers) that they remembered 
from previous tests.23 With each student remembering just one or two 
questions, the aggregate question pool was apparently substantial. 24 As a 
consequence of this question pooling, ETS claimed that national average 
test scores had increased one hundred points in China, and fifty points in 
Taiwan and South Korea.25 
Because testing agencies reuse exam questions, many standardized 
testing exams are vulnerable to question pooling. The same test questions 
may appear on multiple exams over a certain period of time, especially 
on computer-based tests.Z6 Even on paper and pencil exams, a significant 
percentage of test questions may be re-used, primarily for the purposes of 
maintaining consistency across successive tests.27 While Internet 
question pooling is of recent concern to testing agencies, attempts to gain 
an edge by studying prior test questions are nothing new. Testing 
agencies have for many years been locked in intellectual property battles 
with their traditional test-prep nemeses, Kaplan and Princeton Review, 
accusing them of improperly using copyrighted materials from previous 
exams and even sending in dumm1 test-takers with the express purpose 
of copying questions from exams. 8 In an effort to curb the leaking of 
22. !d. The GRE Board, which sets policies and oversees the use of the GRE. "felt it had no 
choice but to tell graduate schools about the problems with the test, but [was nonetheless] trying to 
publicly acknowledge that many Asian students [were] scoring high because of hard work, not 
cheating.'" /d. Meanwhile, the ETS was "urging universities to look at the scores in the context of the 
students' other achievements, their essays, and their letters of recommendation.'' /d. 
23. !d. 
24. !d. 
25. !d. 
26. !d. 
27. See Nat/. Con/ of'Bar txamrs. v. Saccuz::.o, 2003 WL 21467772 (S.D. Cal. June 10, 2003) 
(citing Educ. Testing Serv. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533 (3d Cir. 1986)) (discussing the importance of 
reusing test questions). See also infra n. 303 (discussing a Supreme Court opinion that explained this 
process). 
2K H.g. Lernann, supra n. II, at 113 (recounting how Stanley Kaplan, founder of Kaplan 
schools, was treated as a "pariah" by the ETS, particularly for holding post-SAT parties where 
students remembered and discussed questions from the exam they just took), 229 (recounting how 
"[i]n the early days, [John] Katzman [founder of Princeton Review] obtained his prep materials by 
doing exactly what Kaplan had done in his early days. As [Katzman] put it: 'We'd send people in to 
take tests, and send ourselves in. I'd take ten, fifteen kids and say: I'll buy you Chinese food if you 
tell me as many questions as you can remember"'). See also Critics Blast College Board 
Requirement That SAT Proc/ors Take "Oath" on Coaching, 48 Chron. of Higher Educ. A35 (Oct. 
19, 2001) [hereinafter Critics Blasi] (reporting that the College Board discovered in Spring 200 I 
"that a secure copy of the SAT II biology exam had been copied without authorization and was used 
in private coaching"); Educ. Testing Scrv. v. Stanley Kaplan Educ. Clr., 965 F. Supp. 731, 734-35 
(D. Mel. 1997) (recounting how in 1994 a Kaplan GRE product director sent several students in to 
reconnoiter a new computer-based GRE-CAT to look for testing differences from the paper and 
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test questions, ETS recently made the controversial demand that its SAT 
proctors sign an oath that they would not work for test-prep schools 
because of concerns that proctors would filch or reproduce exam 
. 29 questiOns. 
Naturally, reliable information on re-used questions is a valuable 
commodity, and a major chip to be parlayed in the game of high stakes 
testing, both for students and the cram schools that cater to them in an 
increasingly competitive market. This is particularly true when a small 
bump in a student's standardized test score can mean the difference in 
that student gaining ~d~iss~on _to an elite school or ~rofession with all 
the attendant economic Imphcatwns of that admission. 0 
High-tech spying techniques further expand the scope of the cheating 
problem. With sophisticated technologies increasingly available to the 
general public, the level to which determined test "spies" can go in their 
efforts to pilfer test questions is daunting. For example, two Columbia 
undergraduate students were recently arrested for using walkie-talkies 
and hij)h-tech transmitters to steal questions from a computer-based GRE 
exam. Having gained admittance to a special disabilities testing room 
by feigning a respiratory illness, the ostensible examinee distracted the 
proctor, while his partner snuck into the testing room and attached a 
device that not only intercepted questions from the computer but also 
. h b 'ld' 32 transmitted them to a van parked outside t e UI mg. 
This does not mean that a wily student need be particularly high-tech 
to succeed in dramatically raising a test score by cheating. While 
standardized exams, particularly graduate and professional tests, ~re 
· · 1 bei·ng administered through computer-based testmg 
mcreasmg Y · d (CBT),33 pencil and paper exams are still the norm for K-12 testmg an 
-
1 
· b t at the same time confirmed that test security was compromised by "high overlap" 
penc1 versiOn u 
between pools of questions on different tests). 
29. Critics Blast, supra n. 28, at A35. . . , 
30_ For a harsh example of how the smallest test score fractions can determme an exammee s 
I 
". h 576 s E 2d 899 900 (Ga. 2003) in which a Georg1a Bar exammee contested 
future, see n re ,)mg , · · ' ' . E 1 · him 
h 
· ACT rounded and scaled his raw scores on the Multlstate Bar xam, eavmg 
t e way exammer G · s 
with a 269.9 total score, short of the 270 points he needed for admission .. As the eorg1a upreme 
Court put it, bluntly and without a trace of sympathy: "applicant Smgh ach1eved a score of269.9, not 
a passing score." !d. · 34 
31. Dan Carnevale, High-Tech Cheating Alleged in GRE, 49 Chron. of H1gher Educ. A 
(Dec. 6, 2002). 
32. !d. . d T .r h 
33 See Allison Yang, A New and Improved Way to Fail: Why the Standardtze ests <If t e 
Future ~on't be Quite So Standard Anymore, 30 Yale Herald Online I~~ 2, 7~10 (Oct. 27, 2000) 
http://www.yaleherald.com/archive/xxx/2000.1 0.27/features/exc\usive.htm\ (statmg that both the 
GRE and the GMA T are now computer based, with the GRE exclusively so m Amenca, an~ 
discussing how computer-based tests may favor younger, more tech-savvy exammees and ~~~ 
from the developed world); see also JustColleges, About the TOEFL ' 
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college-entrance testing,34 and both are vulnerable to students copying 
from their neighbors and to imposter examinees taking tests as "ringers" 
for other students. The vulnerability lies not in the test-taking process 
itself but in the failure of identity checking procedures to stop 
impersonators before they sit for tests. 
Proof of the extent of this imposter examinee problem can be found 
in the approximately sixty criminal cases pending in the District Court of 
New Jersey in which numerous foreign nationals are charged with 
attempting to defraud ETS in connection with its Test of English as a 
Foreign Language (TOEFL) exam by using imposters to test for them.35 
In one of the first pre-trial determinations rendered in this slew of cases, 
United States v. Alsugair,36 the district court held that ETS had a 
property interest in both its trademark and goodwill, and that the 
defendant could be charged with mail fraud for depriving ETS of that 
interest37 through an elaborate scheme involving the substitution of 
photographs, forging of documents, and the mailing of a phony ETS 
38 
envelope. 
http://www.justcolleges.com/ tests/index.phtml?no=tests_toeflcbt.htm (accessed Sept. 28, 2005) 
(indicating that the Test of English as a Foreign Language is now offered both as a CBT and a paper 
and pencil test and explaining some of the advantages and disadvantages of each); American College 
of Physicians, Board Exams About to Make the Move to Computers, ACP Observer (Nov. 2003) 
(available at http://www.acponline.org/ journals/news/nov03/abim.htm) (announcing that the 
American Board of Internal Medicine plans to change all its certification and recertification exams to 
computer based testing by 2006); American Association of Critical Care Nurses, CCRN and CCNS 
Paper-and-Pencil Exams Offered as Option in Rural Areas, 17 AACN News (newsletter of the Am. 
Assoc. of Critical Care Nurses) 2, ~~ 2-3 (Nov. 2000) (available at 
http://www .aacn.org/ AACN/aacnnews. nsf/0/ d I a 7 40f42a2bcf66882569ce00812ae0 
?OpenDocument#paper) (announcing that pencil and paper exams are available to those living in 
rural areas but noting that the less expensive method of test-taking is at urban computer centers). 
34. See Yang, supra n. 33, at ~ 12 (indicating that the SAT, ACT, and MCAT arc still 
administered by paper and pencil and that "[t]or the SAT and ACT, the obstacle in the high-tech 
conversion is the sheer number of test-takers each year and the still limited computer accesses in 
many secondary schools across the nation"). 
35. See e.g. U.S. v. Alsugair, 256 F. Supp. 2d 306,309 n. 2 (D.N.J. 2003). The court also cited 
to the United States Attorney's Office for the District of New Jersey news release entitled "Dozens 
of Foreign Students Arrested Nationwide in English Language Testing Scam," indicating that the 
problem was not limited to just New Jersey. !d. 
36. 256 F. Supp. 2d 306. 
37. !d. at 319. The court, however, granted the defendant's motion to dismiss allegations 
based on deprivation of ETS's property interest in its copyright, as well as administration and 
scoring services. I d. 
38. The fraudulent scheme for which the defendant was charged was described by the court as 
follows: 
The imposter allegedly appeared at a test site and falsely identified himself as the student who 
had to take the exam. This imposter, posing as the student, had his photo taken at the test site, 
sat for the TOEFL exam, and directed that the exam results be mailed to a predetermined 
location in California. Once the test results arrived, the real student's photograph was 
substituted for the imposter's photograph, and the fraudulent TOEFL exam results were then 
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The scale of these and other attacks on testing security and reliability 
suggest that the reputation of standardized testing agencies and the 
validity of the exams they administer are ever-more fragile. Surveying 
the cram-school landscape, John Katzman, CEO and founder of test-prep 
leader Princeton Review, boldly proclaims, "Let's face it, there's 
cheating at every level ... Teachers cheat. Principals cheat. Sometimes, 
whole communities cheat ... ".39 
In the face of such charges, services like ETS will no doubt continue 
to manifest a very strong interest in protecting their image as providers of 
accurate information. As one court has observed, it is their "sole stock in 
trade." 40 
Ill. BACKGROUND: THE COLLEGE BOARD, ACE, ETS, AND ACT 
In order to better understand the forces at work in standardized 
educational testing cases, some background on the principal testing 
players may be helpful, namely the College Entrance Examination 
Board, the American Council on Education, and the two major American 
testing agencies-Educational Testing Service and American College 
Testing. 
The College Examination Entrance Board (CEEB), founded in 1900, 
is a non-profit membership organization "composed of more than 4,700 
schools, colleges, universities, and other educational organizations," 
which describes its mission as "connect[ing] students to college success 
and opportunity.',4 1 The College Board, as it is generally known, boasts 
of "serv[ing] over three and a half million students and their parents, 
23,000 high schools, and 3,500 colleges through major programs," and 
oversees the SAT, PSAT, and the Advanced Placement Program (AP), 
42 
among others. 
In its early years, the College Board primarily functioned as "a 
tweedy, clubby association of a few dozen private schools and colleges [ 
] founded in 1900 to perfect the close fit between New England boarding 
schools and Ivy League colleges."43 To effectuate this purpose, the 
Board administered "a weeklong battery of essay examinations in 
mailed to schools requiring the real student's exam results in a phony ETS envelope. 
ld. at 309. 
39. Critics Blast, supra n. 2R, at A35. 
40. In rc K.D. v. Fduc. TestinxServ, 386 N.Y.S.2d 747,752 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976). 
41. College Board, Ahout Us, http://www.collcgeboard.com/about/index.html (accessed Sept. 
28, 2005). 
42. ld. 
43. Lemann, supra n. II, at 28-29. 
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various subjects, called the 'college boards, "'44 which served as "a 
uniform admissions test that all the [prestigious] colleges would 
accept. "45 
Later, however, the Board became the administrator of the Scholastic 
Aptitude Test, or SAT as it came to be known, to a much wider body of 
students. The SAT, which had its origins in Army intelligence tests, was 
first tried out on high school students in 1926, not for admissions 
purposes, but in order to establish the test's validity in predicting test-
takers' freshman grades.46 By the mid-to-late 1930's, however, the 
newly-automated SAT, along with a battery of additional subject-specific 
multiple choice tests, became the testing pathway for high school 
students seeking scholarship admission to Ivy League schools.47 Then, 
just weeks after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the essay examinations of 
the college boards were suspended, never to be resurrected, and the SAT 
became the "admissions device" for all students seeking entry to Ivy 
48 League schools. 
Several years later, at the close of World War II, the president of the 
Carnegie Foundation of philanthropic charities approached Henry 
Chauncey, head of testing at the College Board, about the College Board 
taking over the Carnegie-run Graduate Record Exam (GRE) and 
ultimately instituting a national testing agency to administer all 
standardized tests in America. 49 But while Chauncey and the Carnegie 
Foundation were excited about new plans to expand and consolidate 
national testing, a powerful national educational interest had to be 
negotiated with: the American Council on Education. 5° 
Founded in 1918, the American Council on Education (ACE) is a 
non-profit membership organization that now claims to have enlisted 
more than "1,800 accredited, degree-granting colleges and universities 
and higher education-related associations, organizations, and 
corporations" in its ranks. 51 The Council, which oversees the high school 
equivalency General Educational Development (GED) exam, describes 
its mission as "provid[ing] leadership and a unifying voice on key higher 
education issues" and "influenc[ing] public policy through advocacy, 
44. !d. 
45. !d. 
46. !d. at 32. 
47. !d. at 39. 
48. !d. at 54. 
49. !d. at 60-61. 
50. !d. at 62. 
51. American Council on Education, Ahout ACE, http://www.acenet.edu/AM/Template 
.cfm?Section=Aboutl (accessed Sept. 28, 2005). 
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research, and program initiatives. "52 
In 1945, ACE was considered, according to its leader George Zook, 
"the leading educational organization in the country."53 When Zook was 
approached for his endorsement of a national testing agency plan, he 
sought to make the proposed agency a subsidiary of his own 
. . 54 
orgamzatwn. Indeed, he was highly opposed to the College Board, 
which he considered to be a "tiny, regional, elitist" organization, taking 
charge of any national standardized testing plans. 55 Soon after Zook 
made his position known, a committee commissioned by the president of 
Harvard, in order to obtain ACE's support, suggested that the College 
Board essentiallf "hand over all its tests to the new agency and then 
cease to exist."5 
Nonetheless, after much infighting, politicking, and some heavy ann-
twisting from the Carnegie foundation, it was the College Board that 
eventually "won out."57 Consequently, when the Educational Testing 
Service was chartered and opened its doors on January I, 1948 in 
Princeton, New Jersey, Henry Chauncey of the College Board presided 
. . 58 
over Its operatiOns. 
For more than ten years following its inauguration in 1948, ETS 
"'enjoyed what amount[ ed] practically to a monopoly in college 
admissions testing. "'59 Not only did ETS own the copyrights to all the 
major higher education tests, but it had also "inherit[ed] from the College 
Board all the most prestigious private universities in the East as 
clients."60 And yet the activities of the College Board and ETS had 
hitherto been restricted almost entirely to the elite schools of the 
Northeast. If they were to become truly national players, they would 
have to gain entry to the state school systems of the Midwest and West, 
which were generally open-admissions, and resistant to standardized 
d . . d . 61 tests as a misswns evtces. 
Unfortunately for ETS, in 1959, ETS's first serious competitor, 
American College Testing (ACT), was born in America's heartland of 
52. American Council on Education, Mission Statement, http://www.acenet.edu/Content/ 
NavigationMenu/About/Mission/ACE_Mission_Statcme.htm (accessed Sept. 28, 2005). 
53. Lcmann, supra n. I ! , at 62. 
54. !d. 
55. !d. 
56. !d. 
57. !d. at 63-65. 
58. !d. at 65. ETS was chartered with Chauncey as president and James Conant, president of 
Harvard, as Chairman of the Board. !d. 
59. !d. at 102-103 (quoting a confidential internal ETS report circulated in 1958). 
60. Lemann, supra n. 11, at 96. 
61. /d.at97. 
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Iowa. 62 Particularly alarming to ETS' s plans of national dominance was 
the fact that ACT was attempting to capture the same state universities 
that ETS was shooting for. 6 The approaches of the two organizations, 
however, as they battled "state by state," were quite different. While 
ACT attacked from the bottom up, broadcasting a populist message that 
emphasized "guidance and placement of the many," ETS remained elitist 
in approach, with its mission being to find the most gifted students and 
place them at the top universities, while "guiding the rest to lower their 
. . ,64 
aspiratiOns. 
In the coming years, the two organizations carved up the country, 
with ETS seemingly capturing Texas, Michigan, Georgia, and Colorado, 
and ACT claiming victories in Illinois and Ohio.65 The two companies' 
battle for California's huge state school system typified their contrasting 
approaches-ACT succeeded in winning over "the low-prestige, high-
body-count . . . state[] colleges and junior colleges," while ETS 
eventually managed to capture "the crown jewel, the University of 
Califomia."66 
Today, ETS proclaims itself "the world's largest private educational 
testing and measurement organization,"67 and ACT remains ETS's chief 
competitor, testing nearly as many high school seniors per year as ETS.68 
Though the two organizations retain their non-profit status, they are both 
openly aggressive, competitive, and expansive in their orientation. 
Indeed, ACT announces its vision "[t]o be the world's leading 
provider of information for educational and career decisions in support of 
\ife\ong \eaming."69 Meanwhile, ETS, which "develops and administers 
more than twelve million tests [in almost two hundred countries] 
worldwide,"70 has signaled its intention to "broaden its scope beyond the 
U.S. measurement space into the worldwide education and training 
space."71 This testing goliath, which already formulates and administers 
the SAT, PSAT, AP, GMAT, GRE, and TOEFL, specifically has its eyes 
on "increasing its presence in certain education markets[:] K -12, 
62. !d. at 95: see ACT, Ahout ACT, http://www.act.org/aboutact/history.html (accessed Sept. 
28, 2005). 
63. Lemann, supra n. II, at 95. 
64. !d. at I 03. 
65. !d. at I 04. 
66. !d. 
67. Educational Testing Service, Ahout ETS, http://www.ets.org/aboutets/index.html 
(accessed Mar. 9, 2004) (copy on file with author). 
6R. Lemann, supra n. II, at 95. 
69. ACT, Overview, http://www.act.org/aboutact/ (accessed Sept. 28, 2005 ). 
70. Educational Testing Service, supra n. 67. 
71. /d. 
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oc~upational testing and training, and the international arena-Europe, 
Asia, and Latin America[]." 72 
IV. OVERVIEW OF LEGAL BARRIERS TO SCORE I NV ALIDA TION 
CHALLENGES 
~aun~ing_ hurdles fa_ce standardized testing examinees who challenge 
the m_vahdation of their standardized test scores by testing agencies. 
Exammees lucky enough to have their day in court are often frustrated by 
the r~fusal of co~rts to rule on the merits of whether the particular 
exammee ~heated mstead of on factors that generally resolve favorably 
for the testmg agency. Other difficulties for examinees derive from the 
nat~r_e of ~he equi_table relief they seek. The majority of examinees seek 
an lllJU~ctwn barnng the agency from canceling their scores or directing 
the testmg agency to release or reinstate their scores. This equitable 
postur~ ~akes an examinee's case difficult to pursue for several reasons: 
1) tra?1t10nal deference on the part of courts toward educational testing 
agenc1es and their determinations, based on established equitable 
policies; 2) the expense in bringing an equitable claim; and 3) the high 
burden of proof required for the granting of injunctive relief. 
As this Article's review oftesting case law will show, plaintiffs have 
obtained limited success in only a handful of recorded invalidation cases, 
and even these "victories" did not ultimately result in meaningful relief 
for plaintiffs. An even bleaker picture for suspected examinees emerges 
if one considers that recorded cases likely showcase the claims of only a 
tiny fraction of examinees who maintain their scores were invalidated 
unfairly. The "tip of the iceberg" principle operates in many areas of 
litigation, since reported cases are only a fraction of the total number of 
cases brought to trial, which are only a fraction of the cases settled prior 
to trial, which are only a fraction of the claims never filed, and so on.73 
72. /d. 
73. See Andre N. Mocnssens, Novel Scientific Hvidence in Criminal Cases: Some Words of 
Caution, X4 J. Crim. L. & Criminology I, 9-10 (Spring 1993) (noting the operation of this "tip of the 
iceberg" principle in the context of fraudulent expert witnesses); Linda S. Mullenix, Taking 
Adequacv Seriouslv: Thi! Inadequate Assessment of Adequacy in Utigation and Settlement Classes, 
57 Vand. L. Rev. 1687, 1743 (2004) (invoking the principle in noting that it is difficult to estimate 
the true incidence of class action filings and their attendant litigation "since many class action suits 
involve ongoing litigation in which events and outcomes never result in reported orders, decisions, 
or appellate opinions."); See also Dow v. Donovan, ISO F. Supp. 2d 249, 271 (D. Mass. 200 I) 
("[T]he record of reported cases (probably only the tip of the iceberg) shows a history of slow 
recognition of [frequent conflicts of interest between liability insurers and policyholders sued in 
tort]."); Caroline R. Adams, Student Author, The Constitutional Validity of the Religious Land Uve 
and Institutionalized Persons Act of2000: Will R/uipa 's Strict Scrutiny Survive the Supreme Court's 
Strict Scrutiny~. 70 Fordham L. Rev. 2361, 2381 (May 2002) (recounting scholar's testimony before 
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For the following reasons, however, there is cause to believe that this "tip 
of the iceberg" principle applies with particular force to standardized 
testing claims, and that effective remedies are largely out of reach for 
examinees who have been wronged by invalidation determinations. 
A. Refusal o_fCourts to Make Determinations on Whether Individual 
Test-Takers Cheated 
As will be discussed below, some litigants have brought court 
challenges attacking contractual restrictions limiting dispute resolution to 
internal investigation or binding arbitration.74 Because invalidation 
matters are contractually subject to either the testing agency's internal 
investigation or binding arbitration,75 most disputes will not reach the 
courts. Additionally, the litigants have challen~ed provisions limiting the 
scope and procedural depth ofthese inquiries. Nonetheless, courts have 
invariably refused to rule on the merits of whether particular test-takers 
cheated and have thereby denied plaintiffs any chance to attain their 
ultimate remedy. Rather than ruling on whether examinees cheated, 
courts limit their determination to whether the testing agency I) had a 
substantial basis for challenging the examinee's score, 2) provided 
adequate procedural avenues for the examinee to attempt to validate the 
score, and/or 3) made a good faith effort to investigate the alleged testing 
"irregularities" fully. 77 
The first area of inquiry, a showing by the testing agency that it had a 
substantial basis to challenge a score, is not difficult for the testing 
agency to establish. A review of cases involving cancellation of 
individual examinees' test results shows that the trigger that almost 
always set off the initial investigation was a very large increase in scores 
. 78 8 . . f'~" b across successive tests. ecause testmg agencies can o 1er num ers 
Congress in which he invoked the "tip of the iceberg" principle to assc11 that minority religions were 
"vastly over-represented in zoning litigation and 'frequently discriminated against.'"). 
74. See inji·a nn. 168-176 and accompanying text. 
75. See infi-a nn. 148-156 and accompanying text (discussing testing booklet contract 
provisions). 
76. !d. 
77. See e.g. Murray v. F.duc. Testing Sav., 170 F.3d 514, 516 17 (5th Cir. 1999); Scott v. 
Educ. Testing Serv., 600 A.2d 500, 503--05 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1991); /)a/ton v. Educ. Testing 
Serv, 663 N.E.2d 289,291-95 (N.Y. 1995) (illustrating cases in which courts f(Jcused their inquiry 
on thc8e areas, but declined to rule on whether the plaintiff actually cheated, sec the following). 
78. See rangston v. ACT, 890 F.2d 380, 381 (II th Cir. 1989) (noting that any score that 
increased by more than a certain amount of points would be "automatically flag[ged]" by ACT's 
computer marking system); sl!e also Ko:ca v. ACT, Inc, 2001 WL I 191050, at *I (Mich. App. Oct. 
I 0, 200 I) (reporting that ACT stated in a letter to plaintiff that it "reviewed 'all unusual score 
increases"'); Dalton, 663 N.E.2d at 290 (reporting that plaintiffs score increase of more than 350 
points across successive SAT exams fell into the category of what ETS termed '"Large Score 
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demonstrating the rareness of such large increases between tests 79 and 
studies maintaining they are virtually impossible to achieve fairly, 80 a 
large increase by itself goes a long way to providing a substantial basis 
for the testing agency's challenge. Add impressive-looking statistical 
odds against a test-taker's answer sheet matching so many answers on 
another test-taker's sheet,81 or expert opinion that the handwriting on the 
test-taker's first test did not match her second,82 and the establishment of 
a substantial basis for the challenge is largely a foregone conclusion. 
As to the second area of inquiry, the procedural avenues afforded the 
suspected testee to validate his or her score, there has hardly been a 
testing invalidation opinion that failed to mention that ETS and ACT 
gave examinees suspected of cheating a chance to retest at no expense in 
order to confirm their scores. 83 Other procedures that courts have pointed 
to as adequate means of validating a suspected examinee's scores include 
allowing test-takers to submit evidence that might help to confirm the 
validity of their test results, 84 giving them the chance to be heard at a 
hearing, 85 and offering them the opportunity to submit their dispute to 
binding arbitration.86 Relying on this list of ostensible protections 
afforded the test-taker, courts have uniformly found that testing agencies 
offered suspected examinees adequate procedural avenues to confirm 
Differences"' or '"discrepant scores"' and triggered an automatic investigation); Cortale v. Educ. 
Testing Serv., 251 A.D.2d 528, 528 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1998) (noting that examinee's increase 
of 200 points across successive GRE exams was deemed by ETS "to be suspicious" and triggered an 
investigation). 
79. See e.g Scott, 600 A.2d at 502 (noting that in its internal review, ETS "took into 
consideration the fact that only three test takers out of a sample of over 7,000 recorded gains of more 
than 42 points in [a] General Knowledge test). 
80. See Sarah Stockwell et al., The SAT Coaching Coverup: How Test Preparation Programs 
Can Raise Scores by 100 Points or More and Why the College Board and ETS Deny the Evidence 9 
(Natl. Ctr. for Fair & Open Testing 1991) (noting that up until 1988, the College Board maintained 
that various studies showed that test-prep coaching only raised SAT scores from zero to thirty 
points). 
81. In some cases, these statistics would appear virtually conclusive that the examinee 
cheated. See eg. Tolleson v. Educ. Testing Serv .. 832 F. Supp. 158, 159 (D.S.C. 1992) (citing as an 
established fact that the odds that plaintiff could have answered "all of the 98 correct responses the 
same and 31 out of 38 incorrect responses the same" as a neighboring examinee arc "less than 1 in 
1 00,000,000;" based on statistical evidence provided by the chairperson of the ETS Board of 
Review). 
82. .Johnson v. Hduc. Testing Serv .. Inc., 615 F. Supp. 633, 637 (D. Mass. 1984 ). 
83. Langston, 890 F.2d at 387; .Johnson, 615 F. Supp. at 637; Koza, 2001 WL 1191050 at* 1; 
Yaeger v. Hduc. Testing Serv., 551 N.Y.S.2d 574,576 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1990). Perhaps the only 
testing invalidation case cited in this Article that did not mention this fact was Cortale, 251 A.D.2d 
528. 
84. Murray, 170 FJd at 516; .Johnson, 615 F. Supp. at 637. 
85 . .Johnson. 615 F. Supp. at 637. 
86. Langston, 890 F.2d at 387. 
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87 
suspected scores. 
Only the third area of inquiry, whether the testing agency made a 
good faith effort to investigate the alleged testing "irregularities" fully, is 
likely to undergo close scrutiny by the court. This area of inquiry will be 
discussed at length later in this Article. 
B. Judicial Deference to Testing Agencies 
Recorded case law shows an established pattern of judicial deference 
to educational testing agency invalidation determinations based ufon 
public policy concerns. In Dalton v. Educational Testing Service, 8 an 
influential SAT score cancellation case, New York's highest court 
opined that Educational Testing Service was due much the same judicial 
deference traditionally accorded academic institutions.89 The court 
summed up its position as follows: 
The comparison between ETS and academic institutions is surely not 
exact, inasmuch as judicial restraint in matters of academic 
achievement is based, in part, on the inherently subjective nature of the 
evaluation to be made by professional educators. Still, similar policy 
concerns militate against directing ETS to release a questioned score. 
When a standardized testing service reports a score, it certifies to the 
world that the test-taker possesses the requisite knowledge and skills to 
achieve the particular score. Like academic credentials, if courts were 
to require testing services to release questioned scores, "the value of 
these credenti~ds from the point of view of society would be seriously 
undermined." 
In In re K.D. v. Educational Testing Service,91 an earlier, much-cited 
law school admissions testing case, the Supreme Court of New York 
County stated specific policy concerns, here echoed by another court: 
[A] testing service "performs a highly valuable service not only to the 
law schools but to the public as well. Moreover, the accuracy of its 
predictions is defendant's sole stock in trade. The less accurate as a 
forecaster its tests are, the less value they have ... "Thus, when unable 
87. This is not to suggest that courts addressing the adequacy of procedural avenues have 
necessarily conducted a constitutional due process inquiry. In a number of cases, courts have ruled 
only on whether the examinee was, in good faith, afforded the procedural opportunities guaranteed 
by the testing contract. See Murray, 170 F.3d at 516; Johnson, 615 F. Supp. at 638; Dalton, 663 
N .E.2d at 291-95. For a review of those cases in which courts have ruled on violation of due process 
claims, see infra nn. 239-303 and accompanying text. 
88. 663 N.E.2d 289. 
89. !d. at 294. 
90. /d. (quoting In re Olsson v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 402 N.E.2d 1150, 1153 (N.Y. 1980)) 
(citations omitted). 
91. 386 N.Y.S.2d 747. 
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to vouch for the integrity of test results, a testing service is "within its 
obligations and dutie~ t? th~2 (college) and to the public in 
requestmg ... a reexammatwn." 
113 
Accordingly, under this policy approach, even if significant factual 
doubt is raised as to whether an examinee actually cheated, the court, in 
balancing the equities, will still stop short of directing a testing agency to 
report a suspect score. 93 Not only do the courts emphasize "the reliance 
that students, educational institutions, prospective employers and others 
place on the legitimacy of scores released by [the testing agency ],"94 but 
they also stress that '"(t]he other test-takers are entitled to assurance that 
no examinee enjoys an unfair advantage in scoring. "'95 Finally, going 
further, courts have declared that a testing agency's reputation itself is a 
weighty interest, and that "'it act[s] within its right to protect its own 
image,"' when it invalidates a suspect score. 96 
C. Expense in Bringing Educational Testing Claims 
Educational testing claims challenging invalidation determinations 
are likely to be very expensive to pursue. Though some standardized 
testing litigants do seek money damages in addition to equitable demands 
for release of their test scores, common sense suggests that such claims 
do not make attractive candidates for contingency representation. This is 
because the chances of success based on established case law are slim, 
and damages likely to be small, if capable of being proved at all. 97 
92. Doe at *7 (quoting In re K.D., 386 N.Y.S.2d at 752) (citations omitted). 
93. See Dalton, 663 N.E.2d at 291~95 (affirming the lower court's determination that ETS 
breached its contract with a high school student by failing to consider in good faith considerable 
factual evidence that the student had not cheated on an SAT exam, yet nonetheless modifying, on 
public policy grounds, the lower court's affirmance of the trial court's order directing ETS to release 
the student's SAT score, requiring only that ETS reconduct its investigation and duly consider 
plaintiff's evidence). 
94. !d. at 294. 
95. Murray, 170 F.3d at 517 (quoting Scott, 600 A.2d at 504). 
96. !d. (quoting In re K.D., 386 N.Y.S.2d at 752). 
97. A fruitless search by the author found no recorded cases even mentioning any money 
damages paid to a standardized testing examinee challenging an invalidation determination. This, of 
course, does not mean that damages have never been paid. Rather it suggests that testing agencies 
have done a good job of avoiding the establishment of legal precedents by wearing plaintiffs down, 
settling when advantageous, or both. See Allan Nairn et al., The Reign ofETS: The Corporation That 
Makes Up Minds 284 (The Ralph Nader Report on the Educ.Testing Serv. 1980) (describing how 
ETS "inundated" a 23-ycar-old pro se plaintiff seeking compensation for a lost semester resulting 
from "an ETS records foul-up" by filing "a docket of legal papers eight inches thick" before 
eventually settling with the plaintiff for $250.00 after "photo-copy costs alone had drained [the 
plaintiff's modest budget"). Vincent F. Nicolosi, Esq., plaintiffs' counsel in the Dalton and Cortale 
cases discussed infra nn. 204~217, 218~236 and accompanying text, recounted how on many nights 
he was "up until three in the morning" trying to answer ETS's legal onslaught during the litigation of 
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Moreover, testing invalidation cases can be factually complex, most 
likely requiring the production of multiple witnesses and costly experts. 
A good example of this may be found in Dalton v. Educational Testing 
Service,98 in which a high school student was accused by ETS of having 
an imposter sit in his place for an SAT test. 99 The Dalton plaintiff sought 
an injunction prohibiting ETS from canceling his score and an order 
compelling release of the score based on specific performance of his 
testing contract. 100 In successfully arguing that ETS breached its duty of 
good faith under the contract, 101 the plaintiff presented a total of sixteen 
witnesses and ETS countered with nine. 102 The trial took twelve days 
and "occupied more than 2,000 pages of transcript." 103 The trial was then 
104 followed by two presumably costly appeals. In the end, the New York 
Court of Appeals effectively denied the plaintiff the relief he was seeking 
when it ruled that ETS would not be directed to release his score. 105 
Dalton is hardly the only instance of a standardized testing plaintiff 
obtaining unfavorable results after presenting an extremely costly 
invalidation claim. Similarly complex claims put forward by plaintiffs, 
requiring the hiring of experts and the presentation of extensive 
documentation, have fared poorly. 106 
those cases. Telephone Interview with Vincent F. Nicolosi, Esq., Counsel in the Dalton and Cortale 
(Mar. 26, 2004 ). Mr. Nicolosi stated that despite the fact that the Cortale plaintiff, based on ample 
evidence supporting her innocence, won the opening rounds of her legal battle to clear her name, 
discussed infra nn. 226-234 and accompanying text, her family decided to finally drop the case 
since they could no longer afford to pursue the matter and the plaintiff had already graduated from 
her graduate program with superlative marks. !d. 
98. 588 N.Y.S.2d at 741, 742 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1992), afl'd in part, 614 N.Y.S.2d 
742, (N.Y, App. Div. 2d Dept. 1994), appeal denied, 629 N.Y.S.2d 720 (N.Y. 1995), afj'd and 
modified, 639 N.Y.S.2d 977 (N.Y. 1995), appeal dismissed, 629 N. Y.S.2d 720 (N.Y. 1995). 
99. /d. 
I 00. !d. This equitable claim was the only cause of action originally brought by the plaintiff, 
though he later amended his complaint to seek money damages under other causes of action. !d. at 
742-43. The equitable claim was separated from the damages action and, following discovery, an 
expedited bench trial was held on the original claim only. /d. at 743. A fruitless search by the author 
found no record of the damages action. 
101. !d. at 744. 
I 02. !d. at 743. 
103. !d. 
l 04. The case was first appealed to the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division and then 
to the New York Court of Appeals./d. 
105. !d. at 294. See infra nn. 212--214 and accompanying text for a discussion on the relief 
granted in Dalton. 
l 06. See also Johnson, 615 F. Supp. at 637-39 (granting summary judgment for defendant 
ETS on all five of plaintiffs claims and noting, even prior to trial, "extensive documentation" 
provided by plaintiff to the ETS Board of Review, four meetings with the Board in which plaintiff 
was represented by counsel, and the hiring by plaintiff of a handwriting expert, whose opinion, 
favorable to the plaintiff, nonetheless could not outweigh three unfavorable opinions provided by 
ETS's handwriting experts); see e.g. Langston, 890 F.2d at 383-88 (describing complex litigation at 
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D. Heavy Burdens for Obtaining Injunctive Relief 
When an individual standardized testing examinee receives word 
that, following a testing agency investigation, his score has been 
determined to be invalid, the only viable options he has to stop the 
fi I. . hd . h. d h. 107 agency rom cance mg or Wit rawmg IS score un er zs contract 
are either to retest, which allows the examinee to validate his score if he 
is able to come within a certain amount of points of the questioned 
108 b. d. b. . 109 h. h ·11 dd h score, or to agree to m mg ar 1tratwn, w 1c WI not a ress t e 
the district court level involving unsuccessful contractual, constitutional, and tort claims, and noting 
plaintitrs hiring of at least two statistical experts in vainly challenging ACT's mathematical 
methods for determining that plaintiff cheated). 
I 07. See infi·a nn. 146-156 and accompanying text (providing a discussion on the test-taker's 
booklet contract with the testing agency). 
I 08. Cases differ, in different contexts, as to the range of points an examinee's retest must 
come within in order to validate a suspected score. Langston, 890 F.2d at 382 n. 4 (test-taker at first 
informed by ACT that retest score had to "confirm" suspected score but later was informed that if 
retest score were "within a couple of points," then suspected score would be validated); Tolleson, 
832 F. Supp. at 159 ( ETS required examinee to test within a fitly to a hundred point range of 
suspected National Teacher's Exam (NTE) score of 650); Koza, 2001 WL 1191050 at *I (ACT 
required examinee to retest within three points of suspected ACT composite score of 24 in order to 
validate questioned score); In re K.D., 386 N.Y.S.2d at 750 (examinee required to retest within fifty 
points of suspected LSAT score); DePina v. Educ. Testing Serv., 297 N.Y.S.2d 472, 474 (App. Div. 
2d Dept. 1969) (testcc told retest scores would have to "approximate[ ]" questioned CEEl3 test 
scores). 
I 09. The current ETS bulletin for GRE testing states: 
Invalid Scores. ETS may f] cancel scores it~ in its judgment, there is substantial evidence that 
they arc invalid t(>r any f ] reason. Evidence of invalid scores may include, but is not limited to, 
discrepant handwriting, unusual answer patterns, and inconsistent performance on different 
parts of the test. l3efore canceling scores pursuant to this paragraph, ETS notifies the test taker 
in writing about its concerns, gives the test taker an opportunity to submit information that 
addresses ETS's concerns, considers any such information submitted, and offers the test taker a 
choice of options. The options include voluntary score cancellation, a free retest, or arbitration 
in accordance with ETS's standard Arbitration Agreement. 
Educational Testing Service, Graduate Records L\amination lnjiJrmation and Registration Bulletin, 
II (Educ. Testing Serv. 2005) (available at http://tlp.ets.org/pub/grei727122.pdf.). The current 
bulletin for TOEFL testing states: "Note: For paper-based testing, the retest option is available only 
to test takers in the United States and Canada. The arbitration option is available only for tests 
administered in the United States." Educational Testing Service, Test of' English as a Foreign 
Language lnfiJrmation and R<'gistration Bulletin jiJr Computer-based and Paper-based Testing, 15 
(Educ. Testing Serv. 2005) (available at http://www.ets.org/Mcdia/Tests/TOEFL!pdf/toetl'Yt,202005-
6%20bulletin.pdf). See discussion inf'ra n. 156 and accompanying text (listing available options 
afforded the tcstce). 
Although upon the initial questioning of the testce's score, the testee is invited to submit 
evidence supportive of the validity of the score, it is, of course, difficult to prove a negative, and 
unlikely that a testing agency will change its determination (founded upon hard statistical evidence) 
purely upon affidavits as to the testee's character, school performance, or circumstances surrounding 
the testing event itself. In any case, once the testing agency has completed its internal investigation 
and decided the score is invalid, the testee must either retest or submit to binding arbitration. 
Another choice offered the examinee, allowing the recipient school to be the arbiter of the dispute, 
hardly seems a credible option, since the last thing the test-taker wants is for his chosen school to 
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issue of whether or not plaintiff cheated but rather focus on the propriety 
of the testing agency's invalidation action, for example, '"whether the 
testing agency acted reasonably and in good faith in deciding to cancel 
[the examinee's] scores, "'110 or "'whether there [was] substantial 
evidence supporting cancellation of the scores in question based on the 
information available .... "' 111 Should the examinee refuse to retest or 
submit to binding arbitration, the testing agency will move to cancel the 
score. It is at this point that an examinee may have to seek a preliminary 
injunction if he wishes to block the testing agency from withdrawing the 
score or notifying an educational institution to which he has already been 
accepted. Due to the typically high standards required by courts before 
granting an injunction, it is nearly impossible for an examinee to achieve 
such relief. 
An early testing case involving a request for a preliminary 
injunction, DePina v. Educational Testing Service, 112 illustrates just how 
heavy the burdens for examinees are. A testee sought a court order to 
stop ETS from withdrawing his 1968 College Entrance Examination 
Board scores and notifying the United States Merchant Marine Academy 
that his scores had been invalidated. 113 Though the testee was granted a 
preliminary injunction by the Supreme Court of Nassau County, the New 
York Supreme Court Appellate Division reversed the order, calling it "an 
improvident exercise of discretion." 114 While the court cited to "a 
thorough comparison" made by ETS of the examinee's scores with the 
scores of another test-taker, "reveal[ing~ circumstances which indicated, 
prima facie, that plaintiff had cheated," 15 it detailed no particular facts 
from this comparison. 116 Nor did the court explicitly reference the sine 
qua non for the granting of a preliminary injunction-a showing by the 
plaintiff that without the injunction, the plaintiff would be irreparably 
h d 117 R h h . . . . d .. arme . at er t e court, m Issumg Its memoran urn opm10n, 
become aware of doubts as to his score. 
110. Koza. 2001 WL 1191050 at *3 (quoting ACT arbitration agreement form provided to 
examinee that outlined the terms of arbitration to be conducted by the American Arbitration 
Association). 
Ill. Scott, 600 A.2d at 502 (quoting ETS arbitration agreement form submitted to examinee 
that provided for arbitration under American Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration 
Rules). 
112. 297 N.Y.S.2d 472. 
113. /d. at 473. 
114. !d. at474. 
115. !d. at 473. 
116. !d. 
117. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, "[p]erhaps the single most important 
prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction is a demonstration that if it is not granted the 
applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm before a decision on the merits can be rendered." 
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generally "[took] into consideration the legal and equitable principles of 
law applicable to the granting of preliminary injunctions," 118 namely 
that, "[when ruling on such motions] courts must weight [sic] the 
interests of the general public as well as the interests of the parties to the 
litigation." 119 This "weighing" of the interests led the court, without 
comment on the interests of the examinee, to conclude that requiring the 
examinee to retest was "within [ETS's] rights and indeed within its 
obligations and duties to the Academy and to the public," 120 and 
therefore ETS would not be restrained from invalidating the examinee's 
scores and notifying the Academy. 121 
Seven years later, the Supreme Court of New York County, in In re 
K.D. v. Educational Testing Service, 122 faced with "[a]lmost the identical 
issue" decided in DePina, enlarged upon the policy grounds for denying 
a restraining injunction. It likewise found ETS's offer to allow the LSAT 
examinee to retest an adequate remedj, calling it "eminently fair and 
reasonable under the circumstances." 12 Though In re K.D. was a more 
well-reasoned, factual, and expansive opinion than DePina, its policy 
basis for denying an injunction was based on the same assumption made 
by the DePina court-that the testing agency was fulfillin~ its duty to 
maintain reliability in providing "a highly valuable service." 4 
Similarly, in 1990, the New York Supreme Court Appellate 
Division, in Yaeger v. Educational Testing Service, 125 affirmed the trial 
court's summary judgment dismissal of an examinee's suit seeking an 
injunction prohibitin~ ETS from canceling her National Teacher 
Examination scores.' As with In re K.D. and DePina, the court made 
no mention of the testee's equitable interests in retaining her scores, 
citing only to ETS's interests in maintaining testing validity. 127 Once 
again, a one-sided "weighing" of the interests at stake suggested a strong 
judicial presumption not only that the testing agency had good reason to 
challenge the invalidated scores but also that the examinee was actually 
Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 275 (2d Cir. 1985). 
I I 8. DePina, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 474. 
I I 9. !d. (quoting Jack B. Weinstein et al., Weinstein, Korn and Miller CPLR manual, ~ 
6301.21 (Oscar G. Chase ed., rev. ed., Matthew Bender 1980)). 
120. !d. 
121. !d. 
122. 386 N.Y.S.2d 747. 
123. !d. at 752. 
124. !d. 
125. 551 N.Y.S.2d 574. 
126. !d. at 575. 
127. !d. at 576-77. 
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In the somewhat different context of a group invalidation dispute, 
Doe v. The National Board of Podiatric Medical Examiners 
(NBPME), 129 the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York recently provided an object lesson on the steep odds plaintiffs 
face when seeking preliminary injunctions against testing agencies. 130 In 
Doe, podiatry students, whose board scores were invalidated based on 
general allegations of leaked test questions, sought a court order 
compelling the National Board of Podiatric Medical Examiners and ETS 
subsidiary Chauncey to release their scores and certify them as valid. 131 
The court stated that in order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the 
plaintiffs would have to show: "(I) irreparable harm in the absence of the 
injunction and (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b) 
sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair 
ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the 
' .c ,132 
movant s 1avor. 
The court further declared that when the plaintiffs sought a 
manda£ory (rather than prohibitory) injunction "to alter the status 
quo,"IJ3 and a remedy that essentially provided the ultimate relief they 
were seeking (validation and release of their scores), 134 then they had to 
meet the still higher burden of "substantial, or clear showing of, 
likelihood of success to obtain preliminary relief." 135 The court 
concluded that the plaintiffs were unable to meet this burden, citing prior 
case law in which courts, based on judicial deference to testing agencies, 
denied relief to suspected examinees. 136 The court also held that the 
plaintiffs could no_t "show t~at _'extrem~ or ~f{j' serious da~age [would] 
result from a demal of prehmmary rehef.' · Downflaymg the havoc 
retesting had wreaked on the lives of the students, 13 and the fact that 
128. See id. (opining that "the record contains adequate evidence to support ETS' 
determination to cancel the petitioner's scores on the ground of questionable validity," but offering 
no examples of that evidence). 
129. 2003 WL 21403698. 
130. !d. at *I. 
13\. !d. 
132. /d. at *2. 
133. !d. 
134. !d. 
135. /d. at *3 (quoting Jiim Doherty Assocs. v. Sahan Ent., 60 F.3d 27,35 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
136. /d. at **3--4 (relying on In re K.D., 386 N.Y.S.2d 747 and Dalton, 663 N.E.2d 289). 
137. /d. (quoting Doherty, 60 F.3d at 35). 
138. The examinees claimed a litany of hardships including adverse effects on "completing 
their graduation requirements; participating in extemships, internships, and residency programs; and 
obtaining a license for the practice of podiatric medicine." /d. at *2. The court admitted that the 
students had to sit for the retest while "taking a full load of classes and participating in internship 
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five of the sixty students who passed the invalidated first test failed on 
the retest, 139 the court emphasized the harm that would befall the testing 
agency's ability "'to make predictions of competency, acumen, and 
performance based upon its expertise,"' and stressed the "valuable 
service" that the a,ruency provided to medical institutions and the public 
health in general. 1 
Doe shows how high standards for preliminary injunctions, coupled 
with established judicial deference to testing agencies, converge to form 
a difficult barrier for plaintiffs to overcome. Consequently, in order for 
an examinee plaintiff to obtain a preliminary injunction, she may have to 
demonstrate blameworthy or morally questionable conduct on the P.art of 
the testing agency that will tip the balance of equities in her favor. I'll 
programs." !d. Nonetheless, the court opined that the "[d]efendants mitigated the harms suffered by 
plaintiffs by offering a specially-scheduled free of charge retest." !d. at *6. The court emphasized the 
positive stating that "[a]ll but five students passed [the retest]," and characterized seemingly 
reasonable concerns by some students that their passing but lowered scores would hurt them in their 
employment search as "speculative." !d. 
139. !d. 
140. !d. at *7. 
141. ln two cases in which testing plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining preliminary injunctions, 
Cortale v. Educ. Testing Serv., 656 N.Y.S.2d 154 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1997) and Mindel v. 
Educ. Testing Serv., 559 N.Y.S.2d 95 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1990), plaintiffs were able to show, at a 
minimum, irresponsible conduct on the part of ETS. In Cortale, an examinee sought a preliminary 
injunction preventing ETS from canceling her GRE score based upon allegations that she copied 
from another test-taker. 656 N.Y.S.2d at 156. The court granted her preliminary injunction and 
denied ETS's motion for summary judgment in large part on facts that ETS destroyed plaintiffs test 
booklet, in which plaintiff had made notes supporting her answers, after it began its investigation 
into the validity of her scores. !d. at 157. After finding that the plaintiff had offered persuasive proof 
that she would be irreparably harmed by the cancellation of her score, the court held that ETS 's 
"destruction of evidence [ ] created both a reasonable probability of success and balancing of 
equities in favor of the plaintiff." !d. In Mindel, the court granted a mandatory injunction ordering 
ETS to cancel the score of an SAT testee and provide her an expedited retest. 559 N.Y.S.2d at 99. 
As a factual predicate for its decision, the court cited several compelling, even shameful facts 
showing that the administering of the examinee's SAT test was seriously flawed and unfair, 
including undisputed evidence that the examinee's test booklet was borrowed from her by a proctor 
while she was taking the test, and that a small child was allowed to enter the testing room several 
times during the exam. !d. at 97. The court then found that the plaintiffs claim "met the three basic 
requirements for a preliminary injunction." !d. at 98. First, the court found the plaintiff would be 
injured irreparably by the "loss of the opportunity [to gain an early decision from the elite colleges 
of her choice] due to the passage of time" if she were not given an immediate special opportunjty to 
retest and improve her already excellent scores. !d. Second, the court found that the plaintiffs case 
evinced "a likelihood of ultimate success." !d. Third, the court found that the balance of equities 
favored the plaintiff. !d. In support of this last conclusion, as well as its decision to decide the matter 
in favor of the plaintiff without need for a trial, the court pointed to the "the potential harm to the 
plaintiff with no corresponding detriment to defendant." !d. at 98-99. 
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V. AVAILABLE LEGAL A VENUES IN STANDARDIZED TESTING 
INVALIDATION CASES 
[2006 
The following analysis addresses the two principal legal approaches 
that standardized testing plaintiffs have taken in challenging 
invalidations-breach of contract (or unconscionability of contract) 
claims and violation of due process claims. Though some standardized 
testing plaintiffs have also brought tort actions, alleging damages for 
d [; 0 I42 0 .c 0 h 143 e amatwn, mter1erence wit contract, · or even outrageous 
conduct, 144 recorded cases largely show these claims to have been 
. h I d .1. 145 penp era an unavm mg. 
A. Contract Claims 
Though the circumstances surrounding most standardized testing 
cases raise obvious issues of adhesion and good faith dealing, contract 
law has not been an especially fruitful source of relief for examinees 
suspected of cheating. Still, contract law has produced some minor 
victories for examinees. This subsection will first discuss the nature of 
the testing "contract," and then discuss the efficacy of arguments based 
on principles of adhesion and good faith. 
142. Unless a testing agency publicizes its invalidation of a tcstee's score to an individual or 
organization wholly unrelated to the testee's educational use of the test scores, publication will likely 
be deemed privileged. For example, in Langston, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that 
any communication made "pursuant to a duty owed either to the public or to a third party, or where 
the statement is one in which the speaker and the third party have corresponding interests," would be 
privileged. 890 F.2d at 387. Under this standard, the court held that ACT's communications to the 
examinee's guidance counselor, who had the duty of "posting ACT test scores on student's 
transcripts and forwarding them to colleges" were privileged. !d. Thus the plaintiff would have to 
show that the communications were made with malice. !d. The Langston court did not even bother to 
address the unlikely possibility that ACT could have acted with malice, but rather granted summary 
judgment to ACT on the plaintiff's defamation claim after its discussion of privilege and a bare 
statement of the malice standard. !d. See also Johnson, 6 I 5 F. Supp. at 6 I 5 (holding that defendant 
ETS's communications with law schools regarding a suspected examinee's questioned scores were 
privileged). 
143. The court in Johnson summarily dismissed this claim. stating that a showing of 
interference with contract required the plaintitT to demonstrate that the interference was "intentional 
and without justification," and concluding without further discussion that ETS's communication 
with the recipient school in that case was justified. 6 I 5 F. Supp. at 639. 
144. Considering the standard required for a showing of outrageous conduct as stated by the 
Langston court, that is, conduct "outside the bounds of decency and utterly intolerable in a civilized 
society," 890 F.2d at 387, it would appear that this claim, absent the most egregious misconduct 
imaginable by the testing agency, would not have the proverbial snowball's chance. 
145. Supra nn. 142-144. 
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I. Testing "Contracts" 
Before a prospective test-taker sits for a standardized college 
entrance, graduate entrance, or professional licensing exam, that test-
taker must enter into a contract with the testing service formulating and 
administering the exam. 146 This contract between the parties is formed 
when the test-taker signs the test registration form and ostensibl1' agrees 
to be bound by the terms of the registration booklet or bulletin.14 
The registration bulletin or booklet provided by the testing agency 
constitutes a standard form contract, which outlines its terms in langua~e 
exactly the same for every examinee taking that version of the test. 1 8 
The booklet contract generally contains p,rovisions warning test-takers 
against reproducing any part of the exam, 49 or engaging in any number 
of prohibited actions during the exam, such as looking back at sections of 
the test already completed, giving or receiving help from other test-
takers, or viewing other test-takers' answer sheets or booklets. 150 
Typically, the contract-booklet further informs prospective 
examinees: I) that should it be suspected that information has been 
reproduced from an exam, scores from that exam may be invalidated; 151 
2) that the testing agency has the exclusive right to determine the validity 
of an exam; 152 3) that the testing agency has the right to cancel a score if 
it has reason to suspect the score is invalid153 (for example, "if there is 
an apparent discrepancy in photo identification, if the student engages in 
misconduct, [or] if there is a testing irregularity ... " 154); and 4) that the 
test-taker must adhere to the testing agency's procedural guidelines 
146. See Murray, 170 F.3d at 515 (addressing contract formation in the college entrance 
examination context); Doe, 2003 WL 21403698 at *4 (addressing contract formation in the 
licensing/residency admissions testing context); Koza, 2001 WL 1191050 at *7 (addressing contract 
formation in the college entrance examination context); Cortale, 251 A.D.2d at 529-530 (addressing 
contract formation in the graduate school entrance examination context). 
147. Ex Murrav, 170 F.3d at 515. 
148. It would appear that there may be some variations in testing contracts between 
jurisdictions. See Dalton, 663 N.E.2d at 290 (noting that an SAT test-taker agreed to conditions 
contained in a "New York State edition of the Registration Bulletin"). 
149. E.g. Doe, 2003 WL 21403698 at *4 (noting the NBPME bulletin's admonition that, 
'"[a]ny attempt to reproduce all or part of an examination is strictly prohibited"'). 
150. E.g. Koza, 2001 WL 1191050 at *7 (reproducing a passage trom ACT's "'Test Security 
Procedures"' which contains these and other prohibitions). 
151. E.g. Doe, 2003 WL 2140369X at *4 (quoting the NBPME test bulletin's notice that, 
"'examination scores may be invalidated in the event of this type of suspected [sharing of 
information] breach"'). 
152. E.g. id. (quoting contract language stating that the NBPME reserved "'the sole right to 
determine whether or not an examination is valid or invalid'"). 
153. Kg. Koza, 2001 WL 1191050 at *7 (stating, "ACT reserves the right to cancel test scores 
when there is reason to believe the scores arc invalid"). 
154. Murray, 170 F.3d at 515 n. I (quoting the ETS's SAT bulletin provisions). 
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regarding any challenges to the agency's determinations. 155 
Testing booklet contracts generally present a list of options available 
to a test-taker who wishes to challenge a testing agency determination. 
For example, when an SAT test-taker's result "[was] questioned because 
it may have been obtained unfairly," the test-taker, under the terms of the 
booklet contract, was given "five options: (l) the opportunity to provide 
additional information, (2) confirmation of the score by taking a free 
retest, (3) authorization for [the testing agency] to cancel the score and 
refund all fees, ( 4) third-Rarty review by any institution receiving the test 
score or (5) arbitration." 56 
2. The Issue of Adhesion in Testing Contracts 
A number of plaintiffs challenging testing agency determinations and 
seeking to void unfavorable dispute resolution provisions in their testing 
contracts have argued that standard-form agreements between testing 
. d . k dh . 157 agencies an prospective test-ta ers amount to a eswn contracts. At 
least according to general principles of contract law, this conclusion, 
recognized by several courts, 158 seems inescapable because educational 
testing contracts amply meet both the generally-accepted definition of an 
adhesion contract and the individual elements which constitute that 
definition. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines an "adhesion contract" as: "A 
standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by the party 
in a weaker ~osition, usu[ ally] a consumer, who has little choice about 
the terms." 1 9 No doubt, standardized testing contracts match this 
definition, since the contract booklets providing terms are prepared 
unilaterally by the testing services, and the accompanying registration 
forms are signed by student consumers who not only have little choice 
but no choice at all regarding the terms of the contract. 160 
155. E.g. Koza, 2001 WL 1191050 at *8 (quoting an explicit provision in an ACT registration 
booklet stating that the test-taker "agreed to 'abide by all procedures and requirements stated [in the 
booklet], including those concerning test score cancellation and binding arbitration"'). 
156. Dalton, 663 N.E.2d at 290. See also Murray, 170 F.3d at 515 n. 2 (quoting the ETS's SAT 
bulletin provisions). 
!57. E.g., Koza, 2001 WL 1191050 at *9 (rejecting a plaintiffs adhesion contract argument 
under Michigan state law). 
158. Martin v. Educ. Testing Serv., Inc., 431 A.2d 868, 874-75 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 1981), 
overruled on other grounds, Brady v. Dept. of'Personnel, 693 A.2d 466 (N.J. 1997); In re K.D., 386 
N.Y.S.2d at 752; Dalton, 588 N.Y.S.2d 741, 746 (Sup. Ct. Queens County). 
159. Black's Law Dictionary 318-19 (Bryan A. Garnered., 7th ed. West 1999). 
160. In re K.D., 386 N.Y.S.2d at 751 (noting that an examinee could not conceivably "indicate 
to [the testing agency] that the terms contained in the Bulletin were not acceptable to him," since if 
he did so, he would not be allowed to take the exam). 
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A more detailed hornbook articulation of the elements implicit in the 
Black's Law Dictionary definition also suggests that educational testing 
contracts are contracts of adhesion: 
There arc at least three distinct possibilities, which often appear in 
combination [in an adhesion contract]. First, bargaining over terms may 
not be between equals. The standardized contract may be used by an 
enterprise with such disproportionately strong economic power that it 
can dictate its terms to the weaker party. Second, there may be no 
opportunity to bargain over terms at all. The standardized contract may 
be a take-it-or-leave-it proposition in which the only alternatives are 
adherence or outright rejection. Third, one party may be completely, or 
at least relatively, unfamiliar with the terms. The standardized contract 
may be used by a party who has had the advantage of time and expert 
advice in preparing it while the other party may have no real 
. . . . 161 
opportumty to scrutm1ze 1t. 
Upon examination, all three elements in this expanded definition closely 
mirror educational testing contracts. 
First, regarding the relative bargaining power of the contracting 
parties, the contracting student is in a dramatically weaker position than 
the testing agency. To achieve the goal of entering a particular 
university, the individual student by absolute necessity must participate 
in the testing process and receive a favorable score. 162 There is generally 
only one game in town~the testing agency's test~by which the student 
can achieve this goal. 163 By contrast, common sense suggests that the 
testing agency would suffer an infinitesimally negligible loss if the 
potential examinee were to choose to reject the contract booklet terms 
and forego the test. 
Second, the testing agency contract is offered to the potential 
examinee on a "take it or leave it basis." 164 The examinee has no latitude 
to cross out provisions in the booklet contract or pencil in changes. The 
only choice available to the examinee is between accepting the contract 
in its totality or rejecting it outright. 
Third, the average test-taker no doubt reads the booklet agreement as 
a set of rules to be followed rather than as a series of contract provisions 
to be thoughtfully considered before approval. By contrast, the other 
161. E. Allen Farnsworth & William F. Young, Cases and Materials on Contracts 396 (5th eel. 
Foundation Press 1999). 
162. As one court has stated, "[s]incc these exams arc required by almost all accredited 
institutions, candidates have no choice but to take them on the terms olTered." !Joe, 2003 WL 
2140369X at *5n. 3. 
\63. In re Kn., 386 N.Y.S.2d at 751 (noting that an examinee "could [not] contract with a 
party other than the [testing agency] to take a law school aptitude test. since no such entity exists''). 
164. /d. 
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party to the contract, the educational testing agency, enjoys the combined 
benefits of time, legal assistance, and past experience to craft the terms 
of educational testing contracts to favor their interests and withstand 
165 
challenges under the law. 
Despite these clear indications that educational testing contracts are 
contracts of adhesion, many courts of appeal have not characterized them 
as such, much less made a finding that thel should be "closely 
scrutinized" or invalidated as unconscionable. 16 Rather, a number of 
courts have not addressed the issue at all, 167 while others have 
·1 d. . d h II . 168 d h . I . · 169 summan y tsmtsse t e a egatton, note t e tssue on y m passmg, 
or rejected the claim that the adhesion contract was unenforceable under 
a common law test requiring proof that the dis<futed adhesion provisions 
themselves were substantively unreasonable. 17 
In a recent case representing this last approach, Koza v. ACT, 171 the 
Court of Appeals of Michigan ruled that under Michigan law, the 
plaintiff could not meet his burden to show that an arbitration provision 
in an educational testing agreement should be invalid::tted as a term of an 
adhesion contract. 172 The court applied "a two-prong test of procedural 
and substantive unconscionability" as follows: "I) What is the relative 
bargaining power of the parties, their relative economic strength, the 
165. See Nairn, supra n. 97, at 266-67 (discussing how ETS carefully considers the language 
of its contracts and that "public definition of the contractual rights of ETS consumers has been 
judiciously avoided"). 
166. cy: Martin, 431 A.2d at 874-75 (stating that an ETS real estate licensing exam contract, as 
"a contract of adhesion[,] must at [the] very least be closely scrutinized by the court to determine its 
reasonableness"). 
167. Murray, 170 F.3d at 516--17 (upholding a testing contract with no discussion of the 
adhesion issue); Langston, 890 F.2d at 385-g6 (rejecting a plaintiffs contract claims under Alabama 
law with no mention of the adhesion issue); Corta/e, 251 A.D.2d at 529·-530 (discussing the 
provisions of an ETS testing contract with no mention of the adhesion issue). 
168. E.g. Scott, 600 A.2d at 503 (rejecting a motion judge's determination that both "the ETS 
procedures for questioning scores and the arbitration agreement itself 'were unenforceable contracts 
of adhesion."' (quoting the motion judge of the New Jersey Superior Court Chancery Division, 
Bergen County)). The appellate court simply concluded that the "(p]laintiff was not compelled to 
arbitrate ... [ w ]hen she chose arbitration she bound herself by the arbitration agreement, including 
its terms as to the scope of the arbitrator's authority and the procedures to be employed." id. 
169. SC'e e.g /Joe, 2003 WL 21403698 at *5 n. 3 (quoting In re K.D., 386 N.Y.S.2d at 751 for 
the proposition that "contracts with an academic testing service 'would appear to fit the description' 
of an adhesion contract," but not indicating whether or how this would affect the court's analysis). 
170. Koza, 2001 WL 1191050 at **9-10; S<'e also In re K.D., 386 N.Y.S.2d at 752 (finding 
that an educational testing contract was a contract of adhesion, recognizing that the court could use 
various pretexts to invalidate its provisions if deemed unconscionable, but finding that provisions 
empowering the testing agency with the right to cancel the examinee's test score if "there is a 
question about its validity," and requiring the examinee to retake the test to confirm previous scores 
were not "so unfair and so unreasonable" that they should be nullified or disregarded). 
171. 2001 WL 1191050. 
172. !d. at *10. 
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alternative sources of supply, in a word, what are their options?; (2) Is 
the challenged term substantively reasonable?"173 
The Michigan court found that the plaintiff had "presented evidence 
of procedural unconscionability," 174 but held that the plaintiff had 
"provided no authority [showing] that the [disputed arbitration] provision 
[was] substantively unconscionable."175 The court therefore concluded 
that the plaintiff was bound by those provisions in the registration 
materials stating that any arbitration would be conducted solely through 
written submissions and limited to an inquiry into "whether [the] 
defendant [testing agency] acted reasonably and in good faith in deciding 
to cancel the [examinee's] scores." 176 
Because courts addressing the adhesion issue have almost uniformly 
refused to invalidate educational testing provisions on grounds of 
unconscionability, they have either explicitly or implicitly accepted the 
validity of educational testing contracts in their formation and terms. 177 
3. Good Faith Adherence to the Testing Contract 
Once courts have affirmed the validity of standardized testing 
contracts, their attention is focused on whether the testing agency 
performed the terms under minimum standards of good faith and fair 
dealing. 178 Though the results of arguments based on bad faith have not 
been especially fruitful, minor victories in recent cases suggest that such 
arguments may still hold promise. 
The legal contours of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, a duty owed by an¥ party to a contract, 179 have been described 
as "shrouded in mystery." 1 0 Standards for good faith and fair dealing 
173. !d. at **9- I 0. 
174. !d. at *I 0. 
175. !d. 
176. !d. at **S, I 0. Though the Kma court agreed with the examinee that the defendant agency 
could not insist on arbitration in Dallas, Texas, this was based upon the fact that the location for 
arbitration was simply not a provision of the contract rather than on any unconscionability ground. 
The court of appeals reversed the circuit court on this issue only, holding that arbitration should be 
held in the Detroit, Michigan metropolitan area, the hometown of the examinee. !d. at **I 0-11. 
177. C{: Martin, 431 A.2d at 874-75 (putting the words "agreement" and "contract" in quotes 
when referring to an ETS real estate licensing exam application and booklet contract, respectively, 
id. at 870, 874, and suggesting that a booklet contract provision that denied test-takers the right to 
inspect their graded exams could be voided as unconscionable. !d. at 874-75). 
17K Sec inji·a notes 179 -236 and accompanying text (discussing various aspects of good faith 
inquiries in testing invalidation cases). 
179. Dalton, 663 N.E.2d at 291. "Implicit in all contracts is a covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing in the course of contract performance." !d. 
180. Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed Standards .fl!r Evaluating When the 
Covenant of' Good Faith and Fair Dealing !las Been Violated: A Framework fin· Resolving the 
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are notoriously nebulous and many court decisions based on this 
principle amount to "ad hoc" determinations "yielding inconsistent 
results and depriving P.arties of the ability to predict what conduct will 
violate the covenant." 181 Accordingly, some courts and legal scholars 
have tried to formulate a workable framework for applying the principle 
of good faith and fair dealing. 182 A full examination of these standards 
would prove far too lengthy for the purposes of this article. However, 
brief mention of some areas of conduct considered violative of the 
covenant may be useful in the testing context. 
In Dalton v. Educational Te.•;ting Service, 183 certain general 
principles of good faith and fair dealing were announced by the Court of 
Appeals of New York to support its decision that ETS in that case 
violated the covenant. 184 The court, discussing the scope of the covenant, 
declared that "[ e ]ncompassed within the implied obligation of each 
promisor to exercise good faith are 'any promises which a reasonable 
person in the position of the promisee would be justified in 
understanding were included."'185 The court continued, "[t]his embraces 
a pledge that 'neither party shall do anything which will have the effect 
of destroying or il]juring the right of the other party to receive the fruits 
of the contract."' 1 6 The court, defining the standard to be applied when 
the contract "contemplates the exercise of discretion," stated that the 
controlling party had a du!(; "not to act arbitrarily or irrationally in 
exercising that discretion." 1 The court cautioned, however, that there 
were limits to even this low level of scrutiny, and that no good faith 
obligation could be implied that was at odds with the express terms of 
the contract. 188 
The approach taken by the Dalton court is characteristic of the good 
faith inquiry applied by most courts in testing invalidation cases-to 
determine whether the testing agency "arbitrarily or irrationally" 
evaluated the facts and circumstances surrounding a cheating allegation. 
Unfortunately, the issue of relative materiality of injury to the examinee 
Mystery, 47 Hastings L.J. 585,585 (19%). 
I 81. !d. at 586. 
182. !d. at 600- 32. 
183. 663 N.E.2d 289. 
184. !d. at 291-92. According to this author's research, /Jai!On appears to be the only 
invalidation testing case where a court made an attempt to provide the standards under which it was 
making its good faith and fair dealing determination. 
185. !d. at 291 (quoting Samuel Williston & George .1. Thompson, Si'lectiom from Wiffiston 's 
Treatise on the raw of Contracts,~ 1293,3682 (rev. ed .. Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1938)). 
186. !d. (quoting Kirk<' La Sheil<' Co. v. Armstrong Co., ISS N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y. 1933)). 
187. /d. 
18K /d. 
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and testing agency, as well as whether options other than invalidation 
were available to the testing agency, have not been part of courts' good 
faith inquiry, though standards profosed by certain legal scholars 
perhaps suggest that they should be. 18 Rather, courts, through the policy 
arguments outlined earlier in this article, have simply provided 
conclusory statements that the reputation and reliability of testing 
agencies would be harmed if they were forced to release suspected test 
scores. Courts have thus reasoned that agencies have no choice but to 
invalidate suspected scores once they have a substantial basis for 
believing them to be unfairly earned. 
Meanwhile, courts rejecting plaintiffs' bad faith arguments have 
invariably addressed the facts of the cases before them on an ad hoc, 
standardless basis. In doing so, they have focused on the procedural 
options afforded an examinee, particularly the opportunity to retest, as 
well as the quality and nature of the investigation conducted by the 
testing agency. 
For example, in Johnson v. Educational Testing Service, 190 the 
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that 
ETS 's decision to cancel an examinee's dramatically improved LSA T 
score based upon its Test Security Office (TSO) investigation, 
consideration of the examinee's proffered evidence, and discussions at 
four Board meetings, "was a reasonable one, reached with deliberation in 
good faith." 191 The court characterized ETS's decision-making process 
as "lengthy" and noted that ETS had relied on three handwriting 
analysts' opinions in coming to the conclusion that it was not the 
examinee who sat for her test, but an imposter. 192 The court pointed out 
that prior to ETS 's full investigation, ETS had offered the testee the 
opportunity to "retest under special supervision." 193 The court further 
noted that ETS had reviewed the examinee's "extensive documentation" 
189. Under standards proposed by law professors Thomas Diamond and Howard Foss, a party 
to a contract (defendant) violates the principle of good faith and fair dealing if he, inter alia: I) 
"ha[s] reason to know that his conduct would cause plaintiff material contractual injury unless the 
conduct was necessary to avoid material contractual injury to himself," Diamond & Foss, supra n. 
180, at 602; 2) "engages in conduct that injures plaintiffs contractual interests if he ha[s] reason to 
know that there was an alternative which would have provided him essentially the same benefits 
while substantially reducing plaintiffs contractual injuries," id. at 609; or 3) dishonestly evaluates 
facts or circumstances under a contract which "confers discretion upon defendant to determine 
whether particular facts or circumstances exist." /d. at 615. Diamond and Foss suggest that "material 
contractual injury" under this proposed standard occurs "when conduct defeats a party's essential 
purpose for entering into the contract." /d. at 602. 
190. 615 F. Supp. 633 (D. Mass. 1984). 
191. /dat638. 
192. !d. 
193. /d. at 637. 
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before coming to its conclusion. 194 The district court granted summary 
judgment for the defendant and dismissed the breach of contract claim. 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's holding, 
relying on the same "indicia" of reasonableness and concluding "that 
ETS went beyond the letter of its contractual promise." 195 
Similarly, in Langston v. ACT, 196 the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals pointed to American College Testing's "extensive" investigation 
of a high school football player's sizeable increase in his ACT score over 
a previous test and the "alarming similarity" between his current test 
answers and another examinee's. 197 The court emphasized that the 
student had been given the orportunity to retest or submit to arbitration 
but had refused to do so. 19 Thus, in granting a defense motion for 
summary judgment, the court held there was "no genuine issue as to 
whether ACT breached its obligation to act in good faith under the 
199 
contract." 
However, two New York decisions mentioned above, Dalton v. 
Educational Testing Service (1995),200 and Cortale v. Educational 
Testing Service ( 1998)201 held that ETS 's failure to consider evidence 
offered by examinee plaintiffs violated the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing.202 These two relatively recent cases suggest that, on 
appropriate facts, New York courts may now be willing to more closely 
analyze the merits of whether the examinee actually cheated, at least in 
coming to a determination as to whether the testing agenc:1 acted 
"arbitrarily or irrationally," in making its invalidation decision?0 
In Dalton, the New York Court of Appeals quoted with approval the 
trial judge's decision that the ETS Board of Review breached its 
contractual good faith obligations when it "failed 'to make even 
rudimentary efforts to evaluate or investigate the information' furnished 
194. !d. at 638. 
195. Johnson v. Educ. Testing Serv .. 754 F.2d 20, 26 (I st Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Johnson II). 
The court used colorful language in affirming the summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiffs 
claim, stating, "a plaintiff cannot force a trial by pointing to smoke but not fire, and '[h]ere we do 
not even see any smoke."' !d. (quoting Packish v. McMurtrie, 697 F.2d 23,27 (1st Cir. 1983)). The 
court went further, stating that "[w]hile Johnson 'is entitled to all favorable inferences, [s]hc is not 
entitled to build a case on the gossamer threads of whimsy, speculation and conjecture.'" !d. 
(quoting Manganaro v. De laval Separator Co., 309 F.2d 389, 393 (I st Cir. 1962)). 
196. 890 F.2d 380. 
197. !d. at 386. 
198. /d. 
199. !d. 
200. 663 N.E.2d 289. 
201. 674 N.Y.S.2d 753. 
202. Dalton, 663 N.E.2d 289 at 291; Cor/ale, 251 A.D.2d at 529-530. 
203. Dalton, 663 N.E.2d 289 at 293. 
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by [the suspected examinee] .... "204 Though the examinee presented 
verification that he was ill with mononucleosis during his first poor SAT 
showing, as well as eyewitness statements that he was actually in the 
. c h . d d 205 . 1 testmg room 10r t e questwne secon test, assertwns amp y 
supported by detailed and highly compelling evidence,206 the trial court 
found that the ETS Board completely ignored these proofs.207 According 
to the trial court, ETS deemed evidence confirming the examinee's 
presence at his second SAT exam to be "irrelevant" because it viewed 
the examinee's "discrepant scores" between the two tests and alleged 
handwriting discrepancies to be sufficient proof that the examinee had 
achieved the scores unfairly.208 Consequently, ETS concluded that the 
204. 663 N.E.2d at 291 (quoting Dalton, 5SH N.Y.S.2d at 745). 
205. !d. 
206. The trial court detailed the impressive proofs the suspected examinee submitted to ETS 's 
internal investigation as follows: 
[The testee] informed ETS that he had been ill with mononucleosis during the [first] 
examination and submitted evidence of his academic abilities: that he had maintained an 
average of X5 and received second honors while at [his high school]. He also informed ETS 
that he had completed a test preparation or coaching course and he submrtted to ETS the 
diagnostic tests administered by the Princeton Review, a "coaching course" in verbal, math and 
SAT test-taking skills which he attended in the period between the two examinations. Those 
diagnostic tests indicated test results consistent with his subsequent performance on the 
[second. challenged] SAT. 
To support his denial that an imposter had taken the [second] SAT. [the examinee] 
fumished ETS with the report of a document examiner retained by [his] family who, 
disagreeing with the ETS examiner, found that [the examinee's] handwriting matched both the 
May and November SAT examination sheets. Submitted to the test security office was the 
statement of the ETS paid proctor who supervised the administration of the SAT in the 
classroom assigned to [the examinee] ... the proctor informed ETS that she specifically 
recognized [the examinee] at a subsequent meeting, arranged by the ETS SAT test 
administrator ... as being present in the classroom on [the second test date]. She recalled his 
photo identification card. . and remembered having reprimanded him for talking during a 
break in the examination. She also recalled [his family name] ... [and] further informed ETS in 
her statement that [the examinee] had recognized her at this subsequent meeting and was able 
to detail her unique classroom instructions and procedures, including her requirement that 
students sign the roster sheet in her presence beside their printed names. 
The proctor's statement was accompanied by the statements of two students who also 
identified [the examinee] as being the person in the classroom on the day of the exam. One 
student. previously unacquainted with [the examinee], specifically stated that [the examinee] 
had stood out in the classroom that day because he was fair-complexioned and blue-eyed and 
exhibited "an attitude", while the majority of the other test takers were Asian, African-
American or Hispanic. The statement by the ETS paid SAT test administrator ... confirmed 
that the examinee had correctly identified the proctor from other individuals present at the 
subsequent meeting. Lastly, [the examinee] offered to submit to a lie-detector test. at his own 
expense, and to have his fingerprints taken and compared to those latent fingerprints which 
ought to be found on the second answer sheet and test booklet. 
Dalton, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 745-46. 
207. Dalton, 663 N.E.2d at 291. 
208. !d. 
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testee plaintiff "could [only] controvert the Board's preliminary finding 
that the [second improved] score was invalid ... by taking a retest."209 
Although the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts' finding 
that ETS's refusal to properly consider relevant evidence was a breach of 
its contractual duty of good faith, and therefore mandated specific 
performance, it nonetheless "differ[ed] as to the scope of the relief' 
provided by the lower courts.210 While the trial court directed ETS to 
release the examinee's challenged score, and the Appellate Division 
211 
affirmed, the Court of Appeals refused to do so. The court concluded 
that the plaintiff was only due the specific performance accorded him 
under the contract-"good faith consideration of the material he 
submitted to ETS."212 The court rejected the plaintiffs argument that 
this was "an empty exercise" rather than a meaningful remedy and that 
ETS would simply "rubber stamp its ~rior determination without good-
faith attention to his documentation. "2 3 The court pointed to provisions 
in the examinee's contract which provided him with the options of 
"third-party review by any institution receiving the test score as well as 
arbitration," ifETS once more rejected his explanations.214 
If one looks beyond the surface of the Dalton decision, a fair reading 
is that the examinee plaintiffs "victory" was a loss. Though the court 
suggested that the examinee plaintiff would still have viable options if 
ETS once again refused to change its opinion, this is doubtful. First, it is 
highly unlikely that the examinee would wish to submit his case to a 
university inquiry for the obvious reason that this would defeat the 
purpose of his challenge-to prevent ETS from damaging his college 
prospects. And, as noted earlier in this article, his other option, 
arbitration, would be limited to a determination only on whether ETS had 
a substantial basis for challenging the scores, a low burden for ETS to 
meet. Thus, as a result of the court's decision, not only would the 
plaintiff be accorded no forum in which to clear his name, but also would 
quite likely end up having his score invalidated. On the whole then, the 
outcome in Dalton was not particularly encouraging for testing 
invalidation plaintiffs. 
Dalton may also be a negative case for plaintiffs in that the court 
provided key limiting language accompanying the partial relief it 
granted. In particular, the court emphasized that, according to the testing 
209. !d. 
210. !d. at 291. 
211. !d. 
212. !d. at 294. 
213. !d. at 291. 
214. !d. 
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contract, "ETS was under no duty, express or implied, to initiate an 
external investigation into a questioned score."215 Additionally, the court 
stressed that "[n]othing in the contract compelled ETS to prove that the 
test-taker cheated," and that any such requirement "would be inconsistent 
with the contractual language placing the burden squarel1 on the test-
taker to overcome the ETS finding of score invalidity." 16 The court 
pointedly noted that the trial judge had declined to decide the issue of 
whether or not the examinee himself actually took the test, in essence, 
whether or not he cheated? 17 
By contrast, the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division's 
Cortale opinion contains no such limiting language. In Cortale, a GRE 
testee improved the verbal portion of her score across successive tests by 
more than two hundred points, raising ETS's red flags and prompting a 
preliminary investigation. 218 Based upon a statistical analysis comparing 
her answers to another test-taker's, who "may have been seated near 
her," ETS came to the conclusion that the Cortale plaintiff had copied 
her co-examinee's answers? 19 After being accused of cheating, the 
plaintiff submitted considerable exculpatory evidence,220 but ETS 
declined to change its determination. 221 In the meantime
2 
the plaintiff 
had been accepted to a graduate university program?2 When ETS 
notified the examinee plaintiff that it intended to inform her university 
that it was canceling her GRE score, the examinee brought suit seeking a 
permanent injunction restraining cancellation and a declaratory judgment 
validating her score?23 ETS filed a cross motion for summary ju~ment 
dismissing the complaint, which was denied by the trial court? The 
plaintiff won a preliminary injunction pending a final determination of 
the matter and ETS brought an appeal on the denial of summary 
. , 225 
JUdgment only. 
The Appellate Division upheld the trial court's ruling denying ETS 
215. !d. at 292. 
216. /d. at 292. 
217. !d. at 2'14. 
21 K Cortale. 25 I A.D.2d at 528. 
219. !d. 
220. !d. For example, the examinee submitted evidence to ETS showing that she had sutTcrcd 
an injury to her hand prior to the first examination for which »he was taking a prescription narcotic 
for pain. Additionally. she offered evidence showing that her academic abilities were more 
consistent with the higher scores she achieved on her second examination. !d. 
221. !d. 
222. Cortale, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 156. 
223. !d.; Cortale, 251 A.D.2d at 529. 
224. !d. 
225. /d. 
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summary judgment.226 In markedly different language from its Yaeger 
decision eight years earlier,227 the court began its analysis by bluntly 
proclaiming, "ETS, in reliance upon purely circumstantial evidence, 
determined that the plaintiff was guilty of cheating."228 The court, 
denying summary judgment, held that a question of fact existed because 
ETS based its determination "largely upon a statistical analysis of [a] 
pattern of erasures and incorrect answers appearing on the plaintiffs 
answer sheet," and the plaintiff presented "expert evidence which 
attacked those statistical analytical methods as unreliable."229 Moreover, 
the court noted that one of the studies submitted by ETS, "ostensibly in 
support of its motion" actually called into question the reliability of 
ETS's own investigative policies, suggesting that ETS tended to ignore 
submissions offered by examinees in support of their questioned 
230 
scores. 
The Cortale opinion, though providing helpful language for testing 
plaintiffs, should not be overestimated. The court ruled solely on the 
appro~riateness of summary judgment dismissing the good faith 
claim, 31 as orposed to the Dalton court which ruled on the good faith 
claim itself.23 Thus, the Cortale court was not compelled to reconfirm 
the limited remedies available to a test-taker showing breach of good 
faith by the testing agency-further investigation, third-party review by 
the plaintiffs chosen university, or arbitration. Nonetheless, the court 
nowhere suggested, even in dicta, that the underlying issue was only 
whether ETS had a substantial basis for challenging the score. 233 On the 
contrary, the court referenced "the plaintiffs efforts to clear her name 
and prove her entitlement to her score."234 
Moreover, the court, breaking with the tradition of earlier testing 
invalidation cases, stressed the interests of the test-taker, departing from 
well-worn policy mantras advocating deference to testing agencies. The 
court used strong language in this regard, citing "the serious educational 
and vocational ramifications that may flow from a finding that the 
plaintiff cheated."235 Though this last statement was made in response to 
egregious facts that ETS destroyed the examinee's test booklet 
226. ld. 
227. Supra nn. 126-128 and accompanying text. 
228. Cortale, 251 A.D.2d at 530. 
229. !d. 
230. !d. 
231. ld. 
232. Dalton, 663 N.E.2d at 291-··95. 
233. Cortale, 251 A.D.2d 528. 
234. ld. at 530. 
235. !d. 
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containing scratch work that might have substantiated her innocence,236 
it nonetheless stood as an indicator that under appropriate facts, 
deference to the testing agency might give way to sympathetic 
consideration of the examinee's interests. 
Cortale notwithstanding, even if the testing agency is compelled by 
its duty of good faith to honestly consider all of the plaintiffs proffered 
evidence, the nature and scope of an invalidation inquiry will be limited 
to the options outlined in the booklet registration materials. This means 
that a suspected examinee may never be able to obtain a judgment on the 
underlying grounds for an invalidation-the accusation of cheating. As 
one court succinctly put it, "The issue before this court is not whether or 
not [the examinee] cheated on the test; the issue is whether or not [the 
testing agency] could refuse to release the score."237 Or as another court 
stated, "Under the governing law, the outcome of plaintiffs case does 
not turn on whether or not plaintiff cheated on his exam, but only on 
whether or not ~the testing agency] carried out its contractual obligations 
in good faith."2 8 
B. Deprivation of Due Process Claims 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the narrow framing of the legal inquiry 
under contract law has led a number of plaintiffs to allege violations of 
their due process rights. These arguments likewise are generally 
unsuccessful, as many courts fail to classify testing agency conduct as 
state action subject to due process. In some instances, courts have 
acknowledged that testing agencies may be state actors; however, 
because of deference to testing agencies, courts are still likely to rule that 
testing agency conduct satisfies the demands of due process. 
The benchmark due process case in educational testing invalidation 
236. !d. ETS not only destroyed the suspected examinee's booklet but also that of "Candidate 
B" who the examinee had allegedly copied from. Cortale, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 156. The destruction of 
this evidence alone was a sufficient ground for the trial court to find that a question of fact existed as 
to whether ETS investigated in good faith: 
The question of destruction of evidence was not addressed by the [New York Court of Appeals] 
in Dalton or other similar cases. Defendant has asserted that all test booklets are destroyed in 
the normal course of its business. Although litigation had not been commenced in connection 
with the examination (at the time the materials were destroyed) the propriety of destroying 
material which is arguably relevant to an ongoing investigation and a future arbitration 
proceeding (provided in the contract) is, at best, questionable. At the very least, this Court finds 
that it creates a triable issue as to defendant's good faith efforts in discharging its obligation to 
fully investigate the question of plaintiffs academic dishonesty. Accordingly, the cross-motion 
for summary judgment must be denied. 
!d. at 157. 
237. Crow v. Educ. TestingServ., 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18191 (W.D. La. Apr. 28, 1982). 
238. Langston, 890 F.2d at 385 n. 9. 
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law is Johnson v. Educational Testing Service. 239 In Johnson, the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a test-taker accused by ETS of having 
an imposter sit for her LSA T exam failed to state a viable due process 
claim against ETS under the Fourteenth Amendment.24° Consequently, 
the First Circuit upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment to 
ETS, and affirmed the dismissal of the examinee's due process claim?41 
The First Circuit explained that in order for the plaintiff to present a 
cognizable violation of due process, she would first have to establish that 
"ETS [was] a state actor and that its conduct was state action."242 The 
court noted that under Supreme Court law, the Fourteenth Amendment 
provided no protection against wrongful or discriminatory private 
conduct?43 Thus, a plaintiff alleging a violation of due process would 
have to show that the defendant's actions '"caus[ ed] the de;Brivation of a 
federal right [that was] fairly attributable to the State."' 44 The court 
further explained that its "state action inquiry [was] two-fold: (I) 
whether 'the deprivation [was] caused by the exercise of some right or 
privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the 
State or by a person for whom the State [was] responsible,' and (2) 
whether 'the party charged with the deprivation [was] a person who may 
fairly be said to be a state actor. "'245 Therefore, according to this dual 
inquiry, even if a defendant were held to be a state actor, his actions 
ld .1 b . 246 wou not necessan y e state actwns. 
The plaintiff argued that ETS was a state actor because by 
administering the LSA T, "a prerequisite to admission to all law schools," 
the agency "exercise[ d] virtual veto power" over which applicants would 
be admitted to those law schools, many of them state institutions?47 The 
plaintiff further argued that under ETS's contract with the Law School 
Admissions Council (LSAC), the LSAC retained "ultimate 
responsibility" for the content and administration of the LSAT, and 
consulted with ETS regarding the overall "conduct of the program."248 
Finally, the plaintiff pointed out that 45% of LSAC member schools 
were state institutions, and that a number of trustees on the ETS board 
were either public officials or "representatives of bodies that included 
239. Johnson 11, 754 F.2d 20. 
240. !d. at 23. 
241. !d. at 25. 
242. !d. at 23. 
243. !d. 
244. !d. (quoting /,ugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 ( 1982)). 
245. !d. (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937) (citations omitted) (alterations in original). 
246. !d 
247. !d. 
24X. !d. at 23 -24. 
97] 
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The First Circuit rejected the plaintiffs arguments that ETS was a 
state actor. Although admitting that the plaintiffs "conception of state 
action was arguably tenable when her complaint was filed" (prior to a 
lengthy hiatus in district court)250 it concluded that recent Supreme Court 
holdings set standards for finding state action that were "fatal to her 
251 . 252 
theory." The court rehed on Blum v. Yaretsky and Rendell v. 
Baker, 253 in which the Supreme Court held that a nursing home and 
private school, respectively, were not engaged in state action despite the 
fact that an overwhelming amount of their funds were derived from 
government coffers?54 The First Circuit quoted Rendell-Eaker as 
follows: 
The school, like the nursing homes [in Blum], is not fundamentally 
different from many private corporations whose business depends 
primarily on contracts to build roads, bridges, dams, ships, or 
submarines for the government. Acts of such private contractors do not 
become acts of the government by reason of t~ei5 significant or even 
total engagement in performing public contracts. 5 
The court then noted that the Fourth Circuit, in Arlosoro.Jfsv. NCAA,256 
had recently held that the NCAA was not a state actor, 57 because in 
light of the Supreme Court's Rendell-Eaker and Blum holdings, indirect 
state involvement was no longer enough to convert private activity into 
state action?58 The First Circuit reasoned that if the NCAA, with half of 
its members state or federal institutions, was not a state actor, then a 
fortiori, ETS was not a state actor.259 The court opined, "Whereas the 
NCAA is capable of disqualifying an athlete from intercollegiate 
competition, ETS merely reports test scores and lacks authority to decide 
who shall be admitted and who shall be rejected."260 
249. !d. at 24. 
250. !d. at 27. The court made reference to the fact that ETS's motion for summary judgment 
had been "left pending by the district court for a long period of time," indicating a lapse of more than 
twelve years. !d. 
251. !d. at 24. 
252. 457 U.S. 91 ( 1982). 
253. 457 U.S. 830 (1982). 
254. Johnson II, 754 F.2d at 24. 
255. /d. (quoting Rende/1-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840--41) (alteration in original). 
256. 746F.2d 1019, 1020(4thCir.1984). 
257. The Supreme Court, in NCAA v. Tarkanian, later held that the NCAA did not engage in 
state action when it promulgated rules that a state university, unquestionably a state actor, followed 
when suspending its college basketball coach. 488 U.S. 179, 193-94 (1988). 
258. Johnson II, 754 F.2d at 24. 
259. !d. 
260. !d. (internal citation omitted). 
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The court concluded its analysis by finding that "the formulation, 
grading, and reporting of standardized tests [was] not an exclusive public 
function,"261 and that the examinee plaintiff had presented no evidence 
"that public institutions belo~~ng to ETS took the lead in instigating the 
conduct she challenge[d]." Therefore, the court held that the 
examin~e's due process argument could not overcome the hifther 
standard for state action set by the Supreme Court's recent decisions. 63 
The Johnson court, however, cautioned in a footnote that its decision 
did not mean that ETS could never be deemed a state actor engaged in 
state activity?64 The court noted that in Martin v. Educational Testing 
Service,265 in which ETS administered real estate licensing exams and 
admitted that it acted as an agent of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 
266 . ETS was found to be a state actor. The court also ctted Golden Rule 
L •-r I C '" h. 267 . h. h . 1· t1e nsurance o. v. lVlat zas, m w tc an msurance tcensure 
examinee was able to state a claim meriting a trial on violation of due 
process. The Golden Rule plaintiff alleged "that ETS designed 
examinations for licensure of insurance agents and brokers, graded 
examinations, determined who passed, and printed state licenses." 26R 
The court in Golden Rule deemed this activity sufficient to show that the 
defendant ETS was engaged in state action and that the plaintiffs due 
process claim could go forward. 269 
The First Circuit's footnote qualification was apparently ignored by 
at least one federal court piggybacking on the Johnson decision.270 Eight 
years after Johnson, the United States District Court for the District of 
South Carolina boldly and erroneously stated in a testing invalidation 
case, Tolleson v. Educational Testing Service,271 that "[t]he case law is 
uniform in holding there is no due process violation when the ETS 
reports test scores to state agencies. Neither the ETS's acting alone nor 
operating in concert with the state or state agencies constitutes the 
261. /d. at 25. 
262. !d. 
263. !d. 
264. /d. at 25 n. 2. 
265. 431 A.2d at 871 n. 7. 
266. Johnson II, 754 F.2d at 25 n. 2. 
267. 408 N.E.2d 310 (lll. App. 4th Dist. 1980). 
268. Johnson II, 754 F.2d at 25 n. 2. 
269. Golden Rule, 408 N.E.2d at 317. 
270. See Tolleson, 832 F. Supp. at 158, 161 (D.S.C. 1992). The United States District Court for 
the District of South Carolina characterized the Johnson opinion as '"the seminal case, which is very 
similar to the case at bar." !d. 
271. 832 F. Supp. 158. 
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requisite 'state action. "'272 Though it relied heavily on Johnson, the 
Tolleson court apparently chose to disregard the Johnson footnote, 
sweeping Martin and Golden Rule under the rug. 
This was a significant omission by the district court, because for the 
purposes of its state action inquiry, the facts of Tolleson resembled those 
of Martin and Golden Rule, at least to the extent that the testee sought 
admission to a profession for which a standardized ETS test was the sole 
avenue for admission.273 In Tolleson, an examinee wishing to teach 
social studies in South Carolina failed the National Teacher's Exams in 
that subject four times, but on his fifth attempt improved his score by two 
hundred points and was flagged by ETS for cheating.274 In bringing a 
due process claim against ETS and the South Carolina Department of 
Education under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the examinee averred "that the State 
of South Carolina, through the Department of Education and [the 
relevant state statute] empowered ETS to act with the full authority of the 
state."
275 The district court, rejecting the plaintiffs due process claim, 
admitted that the South Carolina "statute provide[d] that applicants 
seeking to teach in South Carolina [had to] take the NTE and that the 
ETS [was] the entity charged with reporting the test scores."276 
Nonetheless, the court found that "ETS [was] a mere vehicle for 
reporting information; the ETS act[ ed] only as a medium for conveying 
examination results. The ETS [had] no authority to determine 
certification or make any judgments as to the qualifications of 
I. ,277 app 1cants. 
Not only did the Tolleson court ignore Martin, Golden Rule, and the 
First Circuit's footnote pertaining to them, but it also failed to consider 
key language in the district court's Johnson opinion, undisturbed by the 
First Circuit on appeal, that distinguished Martin and Golden Rule. 
Specifically, the district court in Johnson stated that Martin and Golden 
Rule 
involved examinations administered by ETS for state licensing 
authorities which were the sole requirement for and the sole method of 
obtaining a real estate and insurance broker's license, respectively, for 
practice in the state .... Here ETS's role [in administering the LSAT] 
more closely resembles [another standardized testing case], where 
satisfactory performance ... was only one requirement of several for 
272. /d. at 164. 
273. /d. at 15R-59. 
274. /d. at 159. 
275. /d. at 160. 
276. !d. at 160 n. R. 
277. /d. at 161. 
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those seeking to be high school P{~~cipals, an oral examination and 
experience being necessary as well. 
Clearly this language at least bore consideration by the Tolleson court, 
since the NTE administered by ETS in Tolleson was "a prerequisite to 
certification" that all applicants had to pass in order to teach a given 
subject. 279 Moreover, the court pointed to no other qualifications or 
testing requirements essential to obtain teaching certification. 
The District Court for the District of South Carolina also failed to 
consider Scott v. Educational Testing Service,280 a case factually on 
point and decided just eight months before Tolleson, in which the 
assumption that ETS conduct rises to the level of state action is implicit. 
In Scott, a New York temporary public school teacher who received 
passing scores on her NTE came under suspicion by ETS, which 
concluded that the examinee had copied her answers on two sections of 
the exam from another test-taker.281 After being offered various options 
by ETS, the examinee chose to submit to arbitration, but requested an 
oral hearing in order to fully defend herself against the accusations?82 
The arbitrator refused the request for an oral hearing and then decided 
against the examinee, ruling that ETS was free to cancel the suspected 
NTE scores. 283 The examinee then filed an action to vacate the 
arbitration award, alleging violations of due process and including a 
claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?84 On the return by ETS of 
an order to show cause why the arbitration award should not be vacated 
and the examinee's NTE scores reinstated, the motion judge ruled that 
"ETS was obligated to afford plaintiff due process because it was 'acting 
as an agent of New York City and the New York licensing 
authority. "'285 The judge found that the terms of the testing contract and 
arbitration agreement were '"unenforceable contracts of adhesion"'286 
and that they violated the test-taker's due process rights because they did 
not afford the test-taker the opportunity to contest the underlying charge 
of cheating.287 The judge then "vacated the award and ordered that a 
'new in-person oral arbitration' be conducted in which ETS would have 
278. Johnson, 615 F. Supp. at 635 n. 5. 
279. Tolleson, 832 F. Supp. at 158-59. 
280. Scott, 600 A.2d 500. 
281. Scott, 600 A.2d at 50 I. 
282. /d. at 502. 
283. /d. 
284. /d. 
285. /d. at 502-03 (quoting the trial court without citation). 
286. /d. at 503 (quoting the trial court without citation). 
287. /d. at 50 I. 
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the burden of establishing that plaintiff had in fact cheated."288 ETS was 
granted both leave to appeal and a stay on the trial court's order.289 
The Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division reversed the 
trial court, holding that the examinee was not denied due process because 
her "interests [were] fairly accommodated by a procedure which 
permit[ted] ETS to cancel scores upon an adequate showing of 
substantial question as to their validity, without any necessity for a 
showing of actual cheating or other misconduct."290 However, in order to 
reach the merits of the due process issue, the court "assume[ d), without 
deciding, that ETS 's conduct was 'state action' subject to the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."291 In marked contrast to 
Tolleson's statement that the case law was "uniform" on the issue, the 
court observed that other courts had come to "variant results" as to 
whether national testing agencies were involved in state action 
depending on the facts of individual cases.292 The court noted, however, 
that those precedents were not determinative since the court would not be 
deciding the issue of state action based upon the trial record?93 
Ultimately, the court concluded that ETS 's procedures satisfied due 
process on policy grounds. The court added a new wrinkle to standard 
policy refrains on maintaining testing reliability by asserting that the 
examinee's interests actually overlapped with the testing agency's, since 
the examinee's "effort to preserve her score [was] bottomed on the 
proposition that they [were] presumptively reliable."294 Citing 
impressive statistical evidence provided by ETS showing an infinitesimal 
chance that the examinee's scores were properly earned, the court 
declared, "Proof of wrongdoing is one way of establishing unreliability; 
but if unreliability is otherwise shown, an absence of proof as to how it 
came about is of no matter."295 Concluding its due process/policy 
analysis, the court quoted from Langston v. ACT on the impracticality of 
requiring a testing agency to show that an examinee actually cheated: 
To demand that ACT prove by eyewitness testimony that an individual 
cheated before invalidating a score would undermine ACT's primary 
function of providing colleges with scores that are highly reliable. ACT 
could not possibly catch every student who cheats in its exams if it had 
288. !d. at 50 I (quoting the trial court without citation). 
289. !d. at 503. 
290. !d. at 504. 
291. !d. at 503 (citing f(Jrkanian, 488 U.S. 179; Blum, 457 U.S. 991 ). 
292. !d. 
293. !d. 
294. !d. at 504. 
295. !d. 
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to produce an eye witness [sic] to confirm every instance of 
. d 296 
m1scon uct. 
In spite of its ultimate conclusion, Scott showed that even after the 
Supreme Court's Rendell-Eaker and Blum decisions, a court could 
entertain the possibility that ETS, at least in a licensing exam, was 
sufficiently involved in state action that its investigation and arbitration 
conduct would have to accord due process to an examinee. The Supreme 
Court's more recent 5-4 decision in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee 
Secondary School Athletic Assn.,297 in which the majority held that a 
state interscholastic athletic association's regulatory enforcement activity 
was state action,298 apparently has not foreclosed this possibility. 
Justice Souter's Brentwood opinion could be seen as widening the 
permissible state action inquiry beyond a more narrow analysis 
predicated on criteria developed from a limited number of the Court's 
cases. 
299 The Brentwood majority "identified a host of facts that [could] 
bear on the fairness of [ ] an attribution [of state action] . . . for 
example . . . exercise 'of coercive power,' . . . [or] when the State 
provides 'significant encouragement, either overt or covert,' ... when a 
private actor operates as a 'willful participant in joint activity with the 
State or its agents ... when it is controlled by an 'agency of the state,' 
when it has been delegated a public function by the State, when it is 
'entwined with governmental policies,' or when government is 'entwined 
. [. ] d I ,3oo m Its management an contro . 
The Supreme Court's cases suggest that a proper state action analysis 
of whether a testing agency's invalidation of an examinee's test results 
(in the most likely context, a state licensing exam) amounted to state 
action, would likely review closely a number of key factors. Did the 
testing agency, in addition to designing an examination for state 
licensure to a particular profession and grading that examination, 
determine who passed, and even print the state licenses, as the court 
296. !d. at 505 (quoting Langston, 890 F.2d at 386). 
297. 531 U.S.288(2001). 
298. !d. at 298. 
299. The Supreme Court, in reversing the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, noted that that court, 
although recognizing "that there [was] no single test to identify state actions and state actors [, ] 
applied three criteria derived from Blum ... Lugar ... and Rende/1-Bakcr ... and found no state 
action under any of them." !d. at 294 (citations omitted). The three factors applied by the circuit 
court were whether there was a "symbiotic relationship between the State and the Association," 
whether the Association was engaged "in a traditional and exclusive public function," and whether 
the Association was "responding to state compulsion." !d. 
300. !d. (citations omitted, alterations added, except last) (quoting Blum, 457 U.S. at I 004; 
f_ugar, 457 U.S. at 941; Pa. v. Bd. ofDirs. of" City Trusts of Phi/a., 353 U.S. 230, 231 ( 1957); West v. 
Atkins, 487 US. 42, 56 ( 1988); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co, 500 U.S. 614, 627-628 ( 1991 ); 
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296,299,301 (1966)). 
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noted m Golden Rule, 301 or could it be deemed a "mere vehicle for 
reporting information ... [with] no authority to determine certification or 
make any judgments as to the qualifications of applicants," as the court 
found in Tolleson'?302 Potential factors, perhaps relevant in determining 
the degree of "entwinement" between the activities of the state and the 
testing agency in a given case might be: whether a passing score on the 
standardized test was the only requirement and only method for 
determining whether the examinee could be licensed for a profession 
within the state; whether the state interacted with the testing agency in 
designing the exam or had a hand in shaping its content; whether the test 
was formulated for a particular state's licensing process or was a 
"generic" national exam, such as the Multi-State Bar Examination 
(MBE);303 or whether the testing agency or the state itself administered 
the test. 
In the final analysis, however, it seems unlikely, based on testing law 
to date, that a plaintiff in an invalidation case can succeed on a due 
process claim, even if that claim survives dismissal and is reviewed on 
the merits, as in Scott. The Scott decision indicates that, absent some 
major shift away from the traditional deference paid testing agencies by 
the courts, and a concomitant standard that those agencies only need 
show a substantial basis for invalidating an examinee's score, testing 
invalidation procedures established and implemented by testing agencies 
301. 408N.E.2dat317. 
302. 832 F. Supp. at 161. 
303. In lfoover v. Runwin, an interesting testing case, an unsuccessful bar examinee sued the 
Arizona Supreme Court's Committee on Examinations and Admissions, alleging, inter alia, that 
members of the commission had violated the Sherman Act by conspiring to restrain trade by 
reducing the number of attorneys who could practice law in the state. 466 U.S. 558, 565 ( 1989). The 
U.S. Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, held that the denial of the examinee's application for the 
Arizona Bar was ultimately the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court and thus the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity applied to the state action of the Committee, rendering proper the dismissal of 
the examinee's claim. !d. at 581-82. The dissent recognized that the Arizona Supreme Court had 
"delegated to [the Committee] the task of administering the bar exam, and retained the authority to 
review or revise any action taken by" the Committee, but argued that those factors were insufficient 
to confer immunity on the Committee under the Sherman Act. !d. at 593-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Although the Court did not address whether ETS, which reported the multi-state portion of the exam, 
was a state actor, it did provide an explanation of the scaling process conducted by ETS, which was 
at the heart of the examinee's complaint-- i.e., that there was not a pre-set number of questions that 
an examinee had to get right to succeed on the exam, but a number determined after the test was 
"scaled," a process "viewed as the fairest" by ETS. !d. at 570. The Court quoted from material 
published by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, which stated that, in order to ensure "the 
same level of competence from test to test," tests needed to be scaled, "since the level of difficulty 
varie[d] from test to test." !d. (quoting the Bar Examiner's Handbook 61-62 (2d ed. 1980)). The 
Handbook further explained that it was a "statistical analysis on [ ] reused questions [that] 
determine[ d) how many points [were] to be added to or subtracted from the raw score to provide an 
applicant's scaled score." /d. 
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are likely to continue to pass constitutional muster. 
VI. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PREVAILING JUDICIAL APPROACH TO 
INVALIDATION CASES 
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, 
Is the immediate jewel qf their souls. 
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing; 
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands; 
But he that filches from me my good name 
Robs me of that which not enriches him 
And makes me poor indeed. 304 
Testing invalidation cases are complex disputes involving many 
factors, not least of which is the weighing of equities between the 
reputation of the test-taker and the reputation of the testing agency. 
Unfortunately for test-takers, courts have long emphasized the interests 
of testing agencies without a corresponding nod to suspected test -takers' 
interests. The likely reason for this is that ETS and ACT are hugely 
influential corporations with carefully-crafted beneficent and infallible 
images305 that influence educational policymaking at all levels of 
306 A h . h ~ . f d . . government. not er reason IS t at, as a 1Unct10n o stare eczszs, 
courts reviewing invalidation determinations have tended to parrot the 
policy statements of prior court opinions, without considering whether 
fresh evidence and social research may have eroded the assumptions 
underlying those policy positions. 
A closer look at the standardized testing environment reveals that a 
number of key assumptions made by courts in forming their opinions 
may be based on fallacies. Perhaps the most important of these 
304. William Shakespeare, Othello, in The Complete Works of'Shakespeare X36, act 3, sc. 3, II. 
155--61 (Shakespeare Head Press cd., Barnes and Noble 1994). 
305. See Naim, supra n. 97, at 276 (noting that despite ETS's gross inefficiencies in servicing 
examinee consumers, an ETS public relations director managed to turn a mechanical error blamed 
on a "crinkle in the comer" of an SAT testee's paper into an opportunity to tout publicly that "'to 
[this director's) knowledge it was the first time a mechanical error interfered with the accuracy of 
computer corrections at the 31-year old testing service, which processes 12 million pieces of paper a 
year."' !d. (quoting In Short: Wrinkled hy a Crinkle, Newsday 2 (July 31. 1979)). This infallible 
image has very recently suffered great damage as the result of widespread, substantial errors ETS 
made in scoring the Praxis teacher-certification exam, and Pearson Educational Measurement made 
in scoring the October, 2005 SAT exam. See lnji·a text accompanying nn. 344--348. 
306. See inf"ra n. 308 (discussing the current ETS President and CEO's efforts to lobby 
Congress on behalf of the No Child Left Behind Act); see also Lemann, supra n. II (describing 
numerous situations in which ETS sought to influence government policy in regard to education and 
testing); Nairn, supra n. 97, at 278-302 (describing ETS's success in maintaining a non-profit status 
that allows it to elude almost any fom1 of government oversight in conducting its operations). 
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assumptions are that: I) testing agencies are altruistic non-profits whose 
primary purpose is to serve education and the public good; 2) testing 
agencies' sole motive in invalidating scores is to maintain the integrity of 
scores relied upon by colleges, employers, and licensing institutions; 3) 
testing agency internal investigations are thorough and can be relied 
upon; 4) suspected examinees' interests are not seriously damaged by 
invalidations, and in any event test-takers are offered the option to 
simply retest and confirm their scores; and 5) invalidating large score 
increases is an effective safeguard against cheating. The following 
section examines these suspect assumptions. 
A. Testing Agencies' Status as Altruistic Non-Profits Serving the Public 
Good 
Contrary to popular characterization of testing agencies as altruistic 
non-profits serving the public good, standardized testing is very big 
business. This past year, ETS, the world's leading testing agency, earned 
a record one hi/lion dollars in revenues.307 No doubt, ETS did not earn 
this astounding figure merely by fulfilling obligations to test fairly and 
accurately, but by aggressively pursuing emerging markets and by 
seeking to promote the influence oftesting in society. 
As an example, in 200 I, ETS lobbied Congress in favor of President 
George W. Bush's No Child Left Behind proposal.308 Soon after, ETS 
boosted its overall yearly dollar revenues by 200 to 250 million dollars 
upon capturing a significant portion of the emerging K-12 testing market 
created by passage of the Act.309 The testing service's subsidiary "ETS 
K-12 Works," which has benefited so handsomely from this huge boom 
in K -12 standardized testing, is a for-profit corporation, as are two other 
ETS b 'd' . 310 su SI Iary corporatiOns. 
307. Interview by Marketplace, "Student Testing" (Minnesota Public Radio Mar. 26, 2004) 
(electronic recording, transc. on tile with the author) (available at http://www.marketplace.org/ 
play/audio.php?media=/morning_report/2004/03/26_mktmorn0850&start=00:00:04:32.0&end=OO:O 
0:07:50.6) (interviewing ETS president and CEO Kurt M. Landgraf). This approximately doubles 
ETS 's revenues since 2002, when it earned 500 million in revenues. !d. 
308. See H.R. Subcomm. on Educ. Reform of the Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 
Hearings on Measuring Success: Using Assessments and Accountability to Raise Student 
Achievem<:nt, I 07th Con g. (Mar. 8, 200 I) (available at 
http://edworkforce.house.gov/hearings/ I 07th/edr/ account380 1/landgraf.htm) [hereinafter Landgraf 
Educational Testimony]. Testifying before the House Education Reform Subcommittee, ETS 
President and CEO Kurt M. Landgraf opined, "I believe in the President's plan. It is the right thing 
for our country, and it is doable." !d. 
309. Interview by Marketplace, supra n. 307. According to Landgraf, this newfound market 
now constitutes "about twenty percent" of ETS's overall revenue. /d. 
310. See Landgraf Educational Testimony, supra n. 308 (recording Landgrafs testimony that 
ETS has "three for-profit subsidiary corporations. The Chauncey Group International develops and 
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As further evidence of this big business bent, one need merely 
consider the types of people attracted to serve on the boards of directors 
of these testing agencies, along with their impressive compensation 
packages. Though testing agenc~ heads have historically been well-
compensated for their efforts, 3 1 recent pay scales are still more 
impressive. Kurt Landgraf, who took over as president and CEO of ETS 
in 2000, received almost $800,000 in compensation for his first ten 
months on the job, and the corporation has doled out giant bonuses to 
312 
other officers and employees as well. Mr. Landgraf, a former CEO of 
DuPont Pharmaceuticals, typifies the new leadership at ETS-once "an 
entity staffed mostly by academics" but one that is now "run by 
executives recruited from the corporate world."313 
The incentive pay systems instituted by these executives are raising 
some eyebrows and callin,r into question the continued non-profit status 
of the ETS corporation. 31 According to tax experts, it can be improper 
for a non-fJrofit to "[cash] out most of its excess revenues in the form of 
bonuses." 15 Critics have charged that large incentive bonuses are 
particularly improper when they are derived from the fees raid by 
examinees who are captives of the standardized testing system. 31 
Further reinforcing the big business bent of testing agencies, 
competitors recognize that ETS may be benefiting unfairly by avoiding 
taxes and oversight from regulatory agencies. 317 As John Katzman, CEO 
of Princeton Review put it, in characterizing the College Board and 
administers occupational certification and professional assessment programs. ETS Technologies is 
devoted to developing and advancing technologies to support on-line learning and assessment 
applications. Our third subsidiary, called ETS K-12 Works, was created to provide testing and 
measurement services to the nation's elementary and secondary schools"). 
311. In 199R, the President of ETS earned $467.481 plus $49,664 in deferred compensation. 
Patricia McAdie & Erika Shaker, Putting ETS to the Test, I Corp. Profiles (newsletter of the 
Canadian Ctr. for Policy Alts.) I (June 20, 200 I) (available at 
http://www .pol icyalternatives.ca!documents/ National_ Officc_Pubs/ets. pdf). 
312. Tamar Lewin, Corporate Culture and Big Pay Come to Nonprofit Testing Service, N.Y. 
Times AI (Nov. 23, 2002). 
!d. 
This is a billion-dollar commercial entity," Mr. Landgraf said. "We're an organization with a 
very strong social mission, but we are also a very large commercial enterprise. Our 
compensation is based on the simple principle that we have to attract people who can help us 
grow, and while we can never pay what DuPont or General Electric does, because we don't 
have tools like stock options, we can use incentive pay and other cash payments. 
313. !d. 
314. /d. 
315. /d. 
316. !d. 
317. See Nairn, supra n. 97, at 278-93 (describing how ETS's non-profit status, clever public 
relations, and adept legal maneuvers provide it a shield against review by agencies like the FTC, and 
insure that "ETS remains almost immune to public oversight," /d. at 284). 
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ETS's entry into the test-prep market, "[T]hey're the same sniveling, 
money-grubbing for-profit businessmen that the rest of us are. "318 
Clearly, a characterization of testing agencies as altruistic non-profits 
serving the public good, if not misguided, does not tell the whole story. 
Were courts to perceive testing agencies as big business instead of as 
entities only serving the public good, they might be forced to reconsider 
many of the policy arguments behind their deference to testing agencies. 
B. Motives Behind Invalidations 
Courts have assumed that when testing agencies invalidate scores, 
they do so in order to protect the validity of representations made to 
universities, employers or institutions relying upon the agency's ability 
to "accurately predict the aptitude of a candidate."319 Courts, however, 
have failed to consider or address the fact that ETS also has a very strong 
interest in invalidating scores that might undermine the public's belief in 
the reliability of the standardized testing process itself. 
For many years ETS maintained that, as accurate indicators of 
knowledge and skills built up over years of study, standardized tests were 
very stable measures. Important to ETS's contention that standardized 
tests accurately indicated knowledge and skills rather than test-takin~ 
ability was the notion that tests were impervious to test-prep coaching?2 
Indeed, ETS made claims that even after many hours of test-prep classes, 
a student could improve his standardized score by only a couple of points 
at most, and therefore test-prep courses were largely a waste of time. 321 
Nonetheless, in living proof against these claims, companies like 
Kaplan and Princeton Review continued to grow and prosper, and 
privileged teenagers, ostensibly well-informed by their wealthy parents 
and peers, continued to take good advantage of test-prep coaching. 322 At 
the same time that influential opinions like In re K.D. v. Educational 
Testing Service323 were being written by judges in the 1970's, ETS still 
maintained that standardized test scores on their tests could not be 
increased by coaching.324 Since that time, however, ETS's position has 
changed. In the face of numerous studies that coaching can improve 
scores significantly, even an average of 100 points on SAT's, ETS 
softened its stand. Indeed, ETS not long ago went into business against 
318. Critics Blast, supra n. 28, at A35. 
319. In reKD., 386 N.Y.S.2dat 752. 
320. See Stockwell, supra n. 80, at 6-10. 
321. !d. 
322. !d. at 3-5. 
323. 386 N.Y.S.2d 747. 
324. !d. at 7. 
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its test-pre~ adversaries and began to market its own test-prep 
materials. 32- Yet even though ETS now admits that an examinee can 
improve SAT scores by perhaps 30 to 40 points through coaching, they 
continue to maintain, against the best evidence, that score increases of 
100 points as a result of coaching are exceedingly rare. 326 
Courts should recognize that score increases large enough to raise 
testing agency red flags are not only disturbing to testing agencies 
because they might indicate cheating by students, but also because, if 
legitimate, they strike at the testing agencies' claims to reliability, 
stability, and the effective predictability of their tests?27 Additionally, 
they call into question the fairness of a system that allows those who can 
afford coaching to gain a significant advantage over those who cannot.328 
Perhaps it makes sense for courts to grant testing agencies the 
discretion necessary to protect themselves and their clients against 
cheaters. No test-taker should be allowed to gain unfair advantage by 
cheating at the expense of another test-taker, nor should universities or 
other institutions be misled into thinking that someone's testing abilities 
were better than they actually were. 
On the other hand, courts should not be in the business of protecting 
testing methodologies or empowering ETS to unfairly invalidate unusual 
scores simply because they upset ETS's long-held contention that scores 
across successive tests cannot be significantly improved. This is a 
business interest, or at best an ideological interest, but certainly not an 
equitable interest. To the extent that courts are protecting such interests 
they are simply favoring one party's well-being over the other party's. 
Moreover, to assist testing agencies in covering up data that casts doubt 
on the reliability of testing methodologies makes a mockery of the very 
policy interest courts seek to protect-"the reliance that students, 
educational institutions, prospective employers and others place on the 
legitimacy of scores released by [the testing agency]. "329 
C. Reliability ofAgency Evidence Indicating Cheating 
Although courts have generally assumed the reliability of agency 
evidence indicating cheating, there are many reasons to suspect the 
validity of the most popular forms of evidence offered by testing 
agencies. Evidence concerning the statistical rarity of large score 
325. !d. at 10-11. 
326. !d. 
327. !d. at 1-2. 
328. !d. 1-2. 20- 21. 
329. Dalton, 663 N.E.2d at 294. 
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increases and evidence concemmg handwriting compansons are 
particularly suspect. 
Courts reviewing testing invalidation cases have largely accepted the 
testing agency position that large score increases across successive 
standardized tests are in and of themselves suggestive of wrongful 
activity.330 However, in light of the inherent conflict of interest testing 
agencies manifest in investigating large score increases, discussed in the 
previous subsection, courts should be more skeptical of this proposition. 
Moreover, as a matter of logic, one does not prove the unnaturalness of 
an event by its rarity alone. For example, it may be extremely rare that a 
falling brick strikes a pedestrian, but that does not lead to a conclusion 
that a malicious human being dropped the brick from a rooftop. In the 
same way, it is quite possible that an extremely large and 
correspondingly rare score increase achieved by an examinee across tests 
may be a result of a combination of unusual but innocent factors. Some 
factors that could account for an increase include prep-school studying 
following the first exam, the examinee's lack of motivation on the first 
331 h k. f d. · b .. h fi 132 · · exam, t e ta mg o me Icatwn e1ore t e 1rst exam,· an lilJUIY. 
. d b .. h fi 333 . h fi 33'l sustame e1ore t e Irst exam, test anxiety on t e 1rst exam, 
. . d. . h fi 335 I bl Improper testing con 1t10ns on t e 1rst exam, persona pro ems 
330. See e.g. Scott, 600 A.2d at 502 (noting that in its internal rt'view, ETS "took into 
consideration the tact that only three test takers out of a sample of over 7,000 recorded gains of more 
than 42 points in [a] General Knowledge test"). 
331. Koza, 2001 WL II'! I 050 at *2 n. 6 (quoting an examinee's statement, "My first score was 
a mindless effort. This resulted from someone who didn't care about his score and didn't think it 
mattered."). 
332. Cortale, 251 A.D.2d at 52'! (noting plaintiffs claim that she was taking prescription 
narcotics prior to her first exam to lessen the pain from a hand injury). 
333. !d. 
334. Nairn, supra n. 97, at 273 (describing the case of an examinee who suffered from this 
condition). 
335. See Law School Discussion, Anyhodv Have Testing Irregularities> I Did and I'm 
Complaining, 
http://70.84.78.174/prclaw/index.php?PHPSESSID~2d633edfc52b7a I de64c41 e955ta68 
8b&topic= 16273.msg246216 (accessed Mar. 1, 2006) (posting recent LSAT test-takers reports of 
irregularities and improper testing conditions at 2004 LSA T examinations, such as one student's 
account as follows: "At my site the lead administrator came to the door and spoke to the proctor, 
then the proctor interrupted us in Section 2 without stopping the clock to tell us she needed for us to 
tear the bottoms of our tickets off and give her the top. Several people started to do this, others 
looked around in distress until someone tlnally said can we do this after the section'? At least 1--2 
minutes gone. I was working on RC, got distracted and had to start the passage over and didn't tin ish 
2 questions. She also interrupted us at least once per section to tell us to have our IDs out for checks 
and to clear the aisles so she could walk around 'without tripping'"); see also infra nn. 350, 351 
(discussing website postings of students detailing numerous instances of testing irregularities and 
unfair testing conditions during standardized exams); supra n. 141 (discussing the improper test 
conditions described in Mindel. 559 N.Y.S.2d 95); infi·a n. 351 (discussing the author's experience at 
an LSA T exam). 
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interfering with the examinee's concentration on the first exam, or 
allowance for the use of a calculator on the second exam. 336 
The focus of the cheating inquiry, therefore, should be over the 
quality of the evidence the agency presents in conjunction with a large 
score increase. Where this evidence consists of statistical evaluations 
regarding comparisons between the suspected examinee's sheet and 
another test-taker's, cases range from those in which the numerical odds 
against the integrity of the score are truly daunting337 to those in which 
courts have recognized that agency data may be questionable or even 
d. d' d 338 ISCre Ite . 
Testing agency accusations of cheating by impersonation are 
generally far less convincing than accusations of copying, given the fact 
that they are based almost exclusively on supposed handwriting 
discrepancies between successive tests. Besides any doubts about the 
credibility of opinions given by agency handwriting experts,339 there are 
several reasons to view such accusations with skepticism. First, 
handwriting analysis, conducted as it too often has been by "experts" 
. h d b. d . I b · I · · 340 wit u wus ere entta s, can e a notonous y mcxact science: 
Second, handwriting samples produced months apart could vary due to 
h . . I. . .b d d 341 c anges m emotwna 1mmatunty, prescn e rug use; or nervousness. 
Third, far more reliable evidence, ignored by testing agencies, may be 
virtually conclusive of whether an examinee took his own test, for 
example, fingerprints on the testing materials themselves, or the credible 
. . f h h d . . d h 342 eyewitness testimony o t e proctors w o a m1mstere t e test. 
336. Koza, 200 I WL 1191050 at *I (The plaintiff claimed he "was able to make short cuts 
with [his] Tl-82 calculator [that] cut the amount oftimc [he] spent on problems in half."). 
337. See supra n. 81 (discussing convincing statistical evidence suggesting cheating by an 
examinee). 
338. See Cortale, 251 A.D.2d at 530 (noting that "plaintiff adduced expert evidence which 
attacked [ETS's] statistical analytical methods as unreliable"). 
339. See Nairn, supra n. 97, at 273 (recounting how one examinee accused by ETS of cheating 
by impersonation showed at trial that ETS's handwriting expert "was the same individual who had 
attested to the authenticity of the forged Howard Hughes signature on the celebrated Clifford Irving 
check"). 
340. Moenssens, supra n. 73, at n. 21 ("The appalling fact that graphologists without training 
in scientific questioned document examination succeed in hoodwinking the legal profession is 
further exemplified by the fact that the respected publisher of the multi-volume PROOF OF FACTS 
recently commissioned the writing of the new chapter on questioned document examination--
handwriting identification, to a graphoanalyst, Dorothy Lehman, who lacks standing in the field of 
forensic document examiners."); see U.S v. Santillan, 1999 WL 1201765, **2-5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 
1999) (providing a discussion on the admissibility of handwriting analysis after Daubert). 
341. Nairn, supra n. 97, at 273 (recounting how a tcstee who suffered from test anxiety and 
took tranquilizers to improve her score believed that the tranquilizers she took affected the quality of 
her handwriting and led to ETS 's suspicions). 
342. See Dalton, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 745-46 (noting that consideration of these and other proofs 
were ignored by ETS in its internal investigation). 
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The heavy weight afforded these suspect forms of evidence is quite 
disturbing, especially in the context of a determination limited to the 
issue of whether a testing agency had a substantial basis to challenge a 
score or conducted its investigation in good faith. Were courts to afford 
examinees' proofs their proper weight within determinations on the 
merits of whether instances of cheating actually occurred, a more 
searching inquiry into the testing agencies' methods of investigation 
would likely result. 
D. Weightiness ofT est-takers' Interests and False Assumptions 
Concerning Re-testing 
Contrary to general assumptions by courts that a test-taker's interest 
in relief is minimal, especially in light of the possibility of re-testing, the 
interests of suspected test-takers in the honesty of their scores are 
weighty. Aside from "the serious educational and vocational 
ramifications that may flow from a finding that [an examinee] 
cheated,"343 an examinee also has an interest in his or her good name and 
self-esteem. These intangible interests stand apart from the worldly 
consequences flowing from score invalidation, but are no less worthy of 
consideration by a court ruling in equity. Thus far, however, few courts 
have even addressed what a suspected examinee stands to lose by an 
accusation of cheating (or in the case of group invalidation, by a mere 
association with an accusation of cheating). 
First and foremost, courts undervalue a test-taker's interest in his or 
her good name. It may be said that an accusation of cheating is akin to a 
criminal charge, and in some cases it actually may be far worse, since 
certain passionate crimes may be morally justified, whereas cheating for 
self-advantage almost never is. 
Though courts have repeatedly noted or assumed that the 
requirement that examinees retest in order to validate questioned scores 
(and their good name) is "eminently reasonable," and suggested that it is 
the suspected examinee who by refusing to retest is acting unreasonably, 
this presumption of a test-taker's guilt endorses a kind of "cheater's 
proof' logic and authoritarianism that might be objectionable to many 
Americans. In light of a presumption that the test-taker is innocent rather 
than guilty, a viewpoint yet to be explicitly entertained by any court, the 
requirement of re-testing takes on an altogether different cast. Certainly, 
to a test-taker wrongly accused, agreeing to re-test may feel like a 
validation of the testing agency's wrongful accusations. Though the test-
taker who stands on principal and refuses to re-test might be displaying 
343. Cortale, 251 A.D.2d at 530. 
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an overabundance of pride or even stubbornness, her reaction is 
nonetheless understandable. 
Moreover, even if an innocent test-taker has no principled objection 
to re-testing, she or he may have legitimate practical concerns about 
submitting to a reexamination. For example, the test-taker may not have 
the same confidence in the reliability and consistency of the testing 
process as the agency has in itself. After all, the innocent test-taker who 
has been wrongly accused by an authority that evinces absolute certainty 
in its investigatory methods and proofs may justifiably doubt that 
company's promises of a fair and consistent retest as well. 
Indeed, recent events suggest that there may be cause to mistrust the 
accuracy of cunent scoring processes in general. As this article goes to 
press, the College Board has had to acknowledge that widespread and 
extremely large computer-scanning enors were made in scoring the 
October 2005 SAT exam, which were only discovered after two students 
requested that their tests be re-scored by hand.344 To date, the Board, 
which has several times had to go back on earlier reports that understated 
the problem, admits 4,400 scores from that exam were marked too low, 
with the largest error coming in at 450 points.345 The Board reported that 
1,600 exams from the October test that had been "separated for special 
processing because of security and other questions" had not yet been 
rescored but would be.346 
This disturbing SAT debacle comes on the heels of an $11.1 million 
settlement announced in March, 2006 between ETS and thousands of 
teachers who were inconectly graded on their Praxis teacher-licensing 
exams, many of whom claimed serious damage to their teaching careers 
as a result. 347 Altogether, roughly 27,000 teachers were inconectly 
graded between January 2003 and April 2004, including 4, l 00 who 
· d f: .,. 34X receive enoneous a1 mg scores.· 
But regardless of whether the prospective re-tester has doubts about 
the integrity of the exam, she may simply doubt her own ability to come 
within the required range necessary to prove the questioned score. For 
the test-taker who suffers from test anxiety, low self-esteem, or serious 
depression (no doubt likely to be worsened by an accusation of cheating), 
344. Karen W. Arenson, SAT Prohlems Even Larger Than Reported, NY Times, Mar. 23, 
2006, availahle at 
http://www. nyti mcs.com/2006/03/23/cducation/23sat.html")cx ~ 1300770000&en~ cab569 
43dc68c522&ci=5088&partneFrssnyt&emc~rss (last visited Apr. 12, 2006). 
345. !d. 
346. !d. 
347. Settlement in Testing Service Lawsuit, CNN.com, Mar. 16, 2006 at http://www.cnn.com/ 
2006/EDUCA TION/03/16/testing.error.lawsuits.ap/index.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2006 ). 
34S. /d. 
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this is a legitimate concern. Requiring this sort of examinee to re-test 
under great pressure at a comparable level might be like asking a 
shortstop who just hit a homerun to duplicate the feat in his next at-bat. 
Although, as discussed earlier in this article, the Scott court 
suggested that the test-taker's interests and the testing agencies' interests 
overlapped in "a common concern that [the testing agency's] scores be 
reliable,"349 this is a specious argument. The truth is that the examinee 
who suffers from depression or test anxiety has no such stake in the 
objective validity of her test score, let alone the standardized testing 
process itself. This test-taker already knows that standardized tests 
results are an unreliable measure of her abilities. Her only interest lies in 
proving that despite difficulties in testing well, at least once, she did 
succeed. 
E. Effectiveness of Invalidation in Combating Cheating and Maintaining 
Reliability 
Because testing agencies generally invalidate only those scores 
which have been red-flagged for showing large increases over preceding 
scores, there are reasons to doubt the final key assumption of courts-
that invalidating scores is an effective way to protect against cheating 
and maintain testing reliability. 
To begin with, it stands to reason that if a test-taker can raise his 
score drastically by glancing over at another test-taker's paper, then 
lower levels of cheating must be easier to achieve and far more 
prevalent. Surely, if a cheater can copy enough answers to raise his score 
by x number of points, he can cheat with a little less industriousness, 
copy fewer answers, and raise his score by a significant but less 
suspicious amount. Similarly, imposters who are capable of scoring 
drastically higher than the individuals for whom they test can play it 
smart by testing to a lower level, thereby managing to fly under the 
agency radar. 
Moreover, catching violators by red-flagging large increases in 
scores does nothing to catch those inveterate cheaters who cheat the first 
time around. Again, if an examinee can raise his score by a large number 
of points on his second or third test through copying, he may also be able 
to do so on his first test and never be detected. 
Apparently, testing agencies are not terribly concerned about those 
who cheat the first time or who escape detection by cheating to a lesser 
degree. Perhaps this is because such cheating does not produce 
embarrassingly large score increases across tests-score increases that 
349. Scull, 600 A.2d at 504. 
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testing agencies might hav ~ trouble explaining to educators and 
employers who have reservations about the validity of standardized 
testing. How else can one justify agency complacency in failing to 
institute safeguards that could make such drastically successful score 
. b h . d'ffi J h' "350 mcreases y c eatmg more 1 Icu t to ac I eve: 
Further evidence that authentic reliability is not a priority for testing 
agencies can be found in the failure of those agencies to institute even 
rudimentary safeguards to insure against unfair and inconsistent testing 
conditions, a far more prevalent and serious problem than cheating. For 
example, the fact that ETS does not bother to provide proctors with 
reliable digital timepieces that would at least improve the chances that all 
examinees receive the same amount of time in which to take their 
351 352 . 
tests, alone speaks volumes. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
350. For a sense of what goes on during high school PSAT. SAT, and AP exams, see College 
Confidential, ETS Needs to Step up Its Test Security. ," hltp://talk.collegeconfidential.com/ 
showthread.php~t=9852 (accessed Mar. I, 2006), a chat room thread in which an owner of a test 
preparation tutoring company attempts to engage students in a conversation regarding irregularities 
and cheating on such standardized high school exams, and expresses dismay at ETS' failure to send 
in independent proctors or monitors to ensure proper testing conditions at high schools. Conveying 
the generally indifferent sentiment a number of students manifested in response to their own reports 
of, inter alia, lazy, incompetent proctors, various forms of blatant cheating, and large timing 
irregularities, one student remarked: "I've never seen blatanr (sic) cheating at the Si\TS hesidcs little 
things like flipping back, flipping ahead, or starting a minute early ... . "!d. 
351. See Law School Discussion, supra n. 335 (posting recent LSAT examinees' numerous 
reports of timing irregularities occurring at 2004 LSA T exams where proctors made incorrect time 
announcements, ended exam sections too early, or allowed students to look ahead at sections or start 
sections early). See also supra n. 350 (discussing a chat room thread that details students' numerous 
anecdotal reports of blatant cheating and testing irregularities, including timing irregularities during 
PSAT, SAT, and AP exams); Silent Technology, The Silent Timerrct. Testimonial & Stories, 
http://silenttimer.com/stories/ (accessed Mar. I, 2006) (promoting a device that allows one to time 
one's exam silently and flashes a light when a test section's time is running out; and providing 
testimonials from examinees who were able to improve their scores significantly through use of the 
device, which has the advantage over regular timers of not beeping and disturbing other test-takers). 
While Silent Technologies warns purchasers of its test-oriented timer: "Some tests do not allow 
timers at all, and others do. The best thing to do is contact your testing administration to be sure," 
Silent Technologies, Legali(v FAQ, http://silenttimer.com/timcr/filq2.php'!cat~7 "Can I usc THE 
SILENT TIMER on test day?" (accessed Mar. I, 2006), its own consumer testimonials make clear 
that examinees arc using such devices regardless of any rules against them. Silent Technology, The 
Silent Timern1: Testimonial & Stories, supra 351. Although rules against timers, if in place to 
prevent examinees from disturbing others with beeping sounds and causing false stoppages, have a 
legitimate purpose, it seems clear that if they stop most examinees from using timing devices, while 
others enjoy the advantages of such devices, inequities obviously will result. 
The author's own experience provides first-hand confirmation of the kind of timing 
irregularities that apparently occur at LSA T exams. In December of 2000, I took the LSA T exam 
administered at the University of Pennsylvania. I used a digital watch that accurately reflected the 
time remaining in any given section of the exam. Upon discovering that the proctor ended the first 
two sections of the exam close to a minute early, I spoke with her. She assured me she was carefully 
monitoring the time and that her watch, which she showed me, was accurate. To my amazement, it 
was a dial watch, with no second hand! Fortunately for me, I took the advice of test-prep books I had 
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egregious testing conditions may not be so rare, and that less egregious 
but nonetheless significant lapses are common?53 
Testing agency complacency regarding unfair test-site conditions 
should cause courts to question whether empowering testing agencies 
with greater discretion to invalidate large score increases serves the 
purpose of increasing overall testing validity. In fact, the opposite may 
be true. If testing agencies are given unbridled freedom to invalidate 
large score increases they label suspicious, they can protect their image 
of reliability while evading closer scrutiny of their testing procedures. 
By contrast, if testing agencies in appropriate cases were required to 
prove cheating by a suspected examinee, the deficiencies of their testing 
apparatus would be exposed for all to see. For example, in those cases 
where an accused examinee argues that he could not possibly have 
cheated because he was seated too far away to see the dots on another 
test-taker's sheet,354 or that he thought each person's test sheet was 
numbered differently, it would not only be ironic to hear the testing 
agency argue to the contrary, but also helpful to hear the agency's 
explanations for not providing the test-taker a more secure environment 
in which to test. Such an airing of crucial facts might prompt a discussion 
of why testing agencies which earn tens of mill ions of dollars in "profits" 
over expenses, choose not to spend greater resources on hiring more 
proctors, providing better training for proctors, seating examinees further 
apart, instituting more sophisticated identity checks, or developing other 
means to greatly lessen or even eliminate the potential for copying or 
impersonation. 
read by Kaplan and Princeton Review advising that proctors commonly shorted examinees on time 
and that one should therefore try to finish a minute early. Others present at that exam, however, may 
have failed to till in any number of answers in time. 
352. To allow proctors to time by their own timepieces, which may not even have second 
hands, see supra note 351, when LSA T examinees, for example, have paid more than 100 dollars 
each for the privilege of testing is nothing short of astounding. One can only conclude that every 
year a good number of law students arc accepted or rejected by their chosen law school based simply 
upon whether a proctor happened to give their testing group a minute more or a minute less on an 
LSA T test section. The fact that ETS docs not take simple measures to eliminate this problem, which 
must surely have been called to its attention numerous times, cannot be explained by cost concerns. 
Reliable digital watches could he purchased in bulk at a cost of only a couple of dollars each. 
Moreover, they could even be specially manufactured to provide just one countdown function for 
those exams, like the LSAT, where each section is of equal length, virtually eliminating the chance 
for timing errors. All the proctor would have to do is push the button. The stopwatch could of course 
be re-used on the next exam. 
353. Supra nn. 335, 351, 352. 
354. Sec Koza, 2001 WL 1191050 at *2 n. 6 (noting that examinee claimed he could not 
possibly have copied so many problems while "sitting in a five feet radius" from other test-takers). 
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VII. SUGGESTIONS FOR A MORE EQUITABLE APPROACH TO TESTING 
lNV ALIDA TION CASES 
Given the fact that so many of the assumptions underlying judicial 
deference to testing agencies are grounded on fallacies, courts should 
rethink their approach to testing invalidation cases. A new starting point 
for courts should be to recognize that standardized testing is just one 
means to predict the abilities of students and employees-indeed a 
means that has been deemed untenable and unreliable by many respected 
educational authorities. The standardized testing industry should no 
longer be accorded the mantle of a quasi-educational apparatus engaged 
in unquestionably meritorious activities. A fairer assessment would be 
that testing agencies are self-interested corporate giants providing 
products and services, at a cost underwritten by testee consumers, to 
those institutions that subscribe to their methods of determining aptitude. 
Courts should also recognize that as candidates for certain 
institutions, examinees must submit to the monopoly control exercised 
by testing companies over the principal means of entry to those 
institutions. Consequently, consumers have no choice but to enter into 
adhesion contracts written by the testing agencies themselves-contracts 
that are lacking in the most basic aspects of consideration that would be 
d d . , I h . . 355 accor e m arm s engt negotiatiOns. 
Though ruling on equitable matters, courts have taken an overly 
formalistic approach to invalidation cases. Courts have granted testing 
corporations the status of public institutions for equitable purposes, yet 
have emphasized their private nature for the purposes of due process 
inquiries. They have ruled that even when a testing corporation has 
utterly refused to consider exonerating evidence in good faith, the 
examinee must find a remedy under the terms of an adhesion contract 
written by that very same testing corporation. 
When a court finds that a testing agency investigation of a flagged 
score was not conducted in good faith, it should not hesitate to exercise 
its equitable powers in ordering that the questioned score be validated 
and released. The approach taken by the court in Martin v. Educational 
Testing Service,356 where the court put quotes around the word 
"contract" when referring to the adhesion agreement entered into by a 
standardized test-taker, and doubted the enforceability of some of its 
355. See Nairn, supra n. 97, at 264 (noting the dearth of conditions in the testing contract "that 
the consumer can legally compel ETS to honor," for example, "scoring the tests accurately, getting 
the information out on time, or protecting confidentiality"). 
356. 431 A.2d 868. 
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provisions,357 is entirely appropriate when the testing agency has 
breached its duty of good faith. Contract scholars, proposing a good faith 
standard in which willful refusal to consider exculpatory evidence by a 
party exercising discretion under the contract "indicates that he does not 
want to know the truth and amounts to dishonesty,"358 have concluded: 
Defendant should not escape [the good faith/willful refusal] standard by 
asserting that plaintiffs evidence would not have induced him to make 
a contrary determination. Defendant's post hoc assertion is of doubtful 
veracity and unverifiable. Therefore, the determination of whether the 
relevant criteria are satisfied or the relevant factual conditions exist 
should be made not by the defendant but by the court. In the SAT case, 
the determination of whether plaintifT cheated would be made by the 
court based on all the evidence1 ipcluding that which plaintifT was denied the opportunity to present.- 5 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Justice goes wanting when a court reviews the established facts of a 
given testing invalidation case, acknowledges that those facts amply 
support the innocence of an accused examinee, but nonetheless stops 
short of granting the examinee a meaningful remedy.360 Ruling as they 
are in equity, courts should rethink their policy of judicial deference to 
testing agencies, choose substance over form, and in appropriate cases 
nullify those tem1s of testing adhesion contracts which produce 
inequitable results. Only then will courts give meaning to the principle 
that, "Where a contract is breached ... and the injured party is entitled to 
specific ~erformance, the remedy must be a real one, not an exercise in 
futility." 61 
357. !d. at 874. 
358. Diamond & Foss, supra n. 180, at 616 (citation omitted). 
359. !d. at 617 (emphasis added). The authors made this statement after reviewing the facts of 
Dalton. 
360. Unfortunately. this is exactly what the New York Court of Appeals did in Dalton. In that 
watershed case, the Court of Appeals did not disturb the trial court's finding that ETS demonstrated 
an egregious and utter disregard for the relevant and exculpatory proofs provided by the suspected 
examinee. Dalton, 663 N.E.2d at 291. Yet the court, ruling in equity. nullified the relief granted by 
the trial court and consigned the plaintiff to an empty remedy dictated by the defendant under the 
terms of an adhesion contract. Sec id. at 294·95 (seemingly whistling in the wind, the court stated, 
"We cannot agree with Dalton's assumption that ETS will merely rubber-stamp its prior 
determination without good-faith attention to his documentation and that reconsideration by ETS 
will be an empty exercise"). Vincent F. Nicolosi, Esq., plaintiffs counsel in Dalton, confirmed that 
plaintitrs SAT score was never validated by ETS. Telephone Interview with Vincent F. Nicolosi. 
Counsel for Plaintiff in Dalton (Mar. 26, 2004 ). 
361. Dalton, 663 N.E.2d at 294. 
